CERTIFICATIO-N OF BANK CHECKS.

no difference in principle between such a case and the others
above cited : .thttatl .at'l Bank v. Botye, 28 La. Ani. 933.
The cheek circulates as the representative of so inuch cash in
on demand to the holder, with the drawer as surety.
bank, p/ale
In this ro-ppct there is little diffcrence between the two classes
of certified check, each kind being in effect promissory notes of
the bank and with this fact giving them currency. But the
check upon which the 'drawer remains liable is better security
than the one for liability upon which he is discharged, ais it has
his promise to pay in addition to that of the bank. This liability of the drawer, however, might not continue long enough
to enable the cheek to circulate as money to any great extent;
fbr if the holder be guilty of laches, by which the drawer is
made to stuffer, Ie camnot recover of him, the rule in stch eases
being the same as though the cheek were uncertified.
For any other questions that may arise in connection with
certificd checks it is believe(] the rules applicable to bills of
exchange and unczrtilied checks will furnish easy solutions.
W. II. BRYANT.
Denver, Col.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Su1)rent Court of Penn. jl'ania.
l11MM[3EL

. SCIIA'MBACIIER.

The proprietor of an inn or tavern is responsible for a personal injury done
to t guest 1y :Llotihr guest who had been suffered by the proprietor to remain
on the premises in a state of intoxication.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 4, of Philadelphia
county.
The facts sufficiently appear in tle opinion.
H1enry D. Ultreman, for plaintiff in error.
Charles it. Downing, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GormoN, C. J.-From the evidence in this ease we gather
the following facts: On the evening of the 9th of August, 1884,
the plaintiff, William Rommel, a minor, entered the tavern of
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the defendant, Jacob Schambacher, and there found one Edward
Flanagan. They both became intoxicated on liquor furnished
them by Schambacher. While the plaintiff was standing on
the outside of the bar, engaged in conversation with the defendant, who was in the inside thereof, Flanagau pinned a
piece of paper to Rommel's back and set it on fire. The consequence was that Rommel's clothes were soon in flames, and
before they could be extinguished he was very badly injured.
He brought the present suit to recover damages from the defendant for the injury thus sustained. The court below adjudged the facts as stated above to be insufficient to sustain the
plaintiff's case, and directed a nonsuit. In this we think it
made a mistake. There is no doubt that the defendant, from
the position he occupied, had a full view of the room outside
of the bar, and did see, or might have seen, all that was going
on in it. If, in fact, he did see Flanagan setting fire to the
plaintiff, and did not interfere to protect his guest from so flagrant an outrage, his responsibility for the consequences is
undoubted. If, on the other hand, he was guilty of making
Flanagau drunk, or if he came there drunk, and Sehafnbacher
knew that fact, lie was bound to see that he did no injury to
his customers. All this is a plain matter of common law and
good sense, and does not depend on the Act of 1854, or any
other statute. Where one enters a saloon or tavern, opened
for the entertainment of the public, the proprietor is bound to
see that lie is properly protected from the assaults or insults, as
well as of those who are in his employ, as of the drunken and
vicious men whom he may choose to harbor. To illustrate the
principle here stated we need go no farther than the case of The
.Pittsburghand Conndlsville Railroad Company v. Pillow, 76 Pa.
St. R. 510.
In the case cited, a drunken row occurred on board one of
defendants' cars, and during the quarrel a bottle was broken
and a piece of the glass struck the plaintiff, a peaceful passenger, in the eye and put it out; held that the company was responsible for the injury thus done. "The plaintiff lost his
eye through the quarrel of a couple of drunken men, who
should not have been permitted aboard the cars, or if so permitted, should have been so guarded or separated from the
VoL. XXXVI.-21
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sober and orderly part of the passengers that no injury could
have resulted from their brawls." If,then, a railroad company
is liable fbr the conduct of drunken men who may chance to
board its cars, much more the tavern-keeper, who not only
permits drunken men about his premises, but furnishes liquor
to make them drunk, and who is thus instrumental in fitting
them for the accomplishment of such an insane and brutal
trick as that disclosed by the evidence of the case in hand.
The judgment of the court below is now reversed and a
new venire ordered.
The above decision, so far as we
have been able to ascertain, is the
first in which the responsibility of an
innkeeper has been held to extend to
the protection of the person of his
guest from the violence of other
guests; and such being the case, it is
of more than ordinary interest.
The liability of an innkeeper to a
guest for damage done to his property,
when within the protection of the
innkeeper's house, has been recognized and well established from the
earliest times of the common law, see
alye's Case, 8 Co. 33 b; and that
liability exist in case of theft or
damage to property, whether the
injury proceed from the innkeeper or
his servants or from another guest, is
so well known that it is not necessary
to multiply authority, it is sufficient
to refer to the cases of Huserv. Tully,
62 Pa. St. 9-1; ll'(dsh v. Portcrfidd,87
Pa. St. 376; Mason v. Thompson, 9
Pick. 280; ,ibley v. Aldrich, 33 N. II.
553; Shaw v. Berry, 31 Me. 478.
With regard, however, to persoald
injuries, the law has been held differently, and a reference to the few
cases in which the matter has been
considered, may not be unprofitable.
alyc's case, 8 Co. 33 b, the
In
court, after citing the words of the
writ given against an innkeeper, as
follows: Cum secundum legerm el con-

suetudinern regni nostri Angliee hospitatore qui hospitia conanne tenent fd
hospitandos homines per partes ubi hujus
modi hospitia existunt transeuntes et in
eisdem hospitantcseorum bona et catalla
infra hospitia ills existentia absque
subtraetione secu inissione custodire die
et nocti tenentur ita quod pro defecta
hu ius modi hospitatorum sen serviturn
suorum hospitibus hujus modi dainun
non ereniat, said, "The word are
hospitibus damnum non ereniat. These
words are general, and yet, forasmuch
as they depend on the preceding
words, they will produce eflkcts. (1.)
They illustrate the first words. (2.)
They are restrained by them, for the
first words are eoruni bona et edataia
infra hospitia illa existentia absque
subtractione custodiw. These words
bona di catalla, restrain the latter
words to extend only to movables,
and therefore by the latter words, if
the guest be beaten in the inn, the
innkeeper shall not answer for it, for
the injury ought to be to his movables which he brings with him, and
by the words of the writ, the innholder ought to keep the goods and
chattels of his guest and not his person, and yet in ease of battery hospiti
damnum cieat,but that is restrained
by the former words, as hath been
said," and this, we are told, was resolved per totam euriam.
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The next case in which the question of the principal decision was
even remotely involved or alluded to
is Newton v. Trigg,1 Show.268 (Anno
3 William and Mary) in which there
is reported a dictum of EYRES, J., in
the course of the enumeration of the
duties of an innkeeper, to the effect
that an innkeeper is bound to "keep
the assize and to prevent tippling,"
and we do not find the question of
liability for personal injuries raised
again until 1878, in Sandys v. Ftorence, 47 L. J. 0. P. 598, in which case
it was alleged that through the
negligence of the defendant, an innkeeper, the plaintiff, a guest in his
hotel, was injured through the fall
of a ceiling. The defendant demurred, and his counsel took the
broad ground that there was no
liability for injuries to the person
of the guest, citing CQlye's Qase. Lrs.DLEY, J., however, held that it wis the
duty of the defendant to protect any
one coming on his premises by his invitation, either expregsed or implied,
from such dangers as he knew, or
ought to have known of, and added,
"it was the duty of the defendant, who
was an hotel keeper, to take reasonable care of the persons of his guests,
so that they should not be injured by
anything happening to them through
his negligence while they are his
guests."
In this country, in Gilbertv. Hoffinan,
66 Iowa 208, an innkeeper who knew
that small-pox was prevalent in his
house was held liable to a guest who
there contracted the disease, REED, J.,
saving, "By keeping their hotel open
for business, they, in effect, represented
to all travelers that it was a reasonably safe place at which to stop." The
question of non-liability for personal
injuries does not seem to have been
raised in the case, and the defense
seems to have been rested mainly upon

contributory negligence, which position was overruled.
These are, we believe, all the cases,
bearing upon the matter under consideration, which have been reported.
None of them, itwill beseen,givedirect
support to the principal case, Calycs
0ue is directly against it, and in none
of them has the innkeeper been held
liable for an injury arising from the
voluntary act of a guest. It is true
that in Gilbert v. Hoffman, the injury
came through a guest, but the injury
was an involuntary communication of
disease. In Sandys v. Florence, the
innkeeper was held liable for personal injury arising from the negligent keeping of his house in a material respect; and the dictum in
Shower could only support the case if
the action of Flanagan in pinning and
burning the piece of paper were the
direct result of tippling or drunkenness as distinguished from wanton
practical joking. Yet, notwithstanding the want of direct authority for
holding an innkeeper, as such, liable
for personal injury wrought by one
guest upon another, the decision of the
principal case, we think, commends
itself to the sound and legal judgment
as eminently proper and just. When
a man keeps open house, and invites
persons to come in for the purpose of
his business, he must be taken to
promise protection against such injuries or risks as the character of the
business he is conducting would naturally suggest to him might be expected where due care is not taken to
guard against their occurrence, andto
insure to the person entering a safe
egress. On this principle it is that
the keeper of a warehouse is held
liable should one coming upon his
premises to transact business with
him fall through an open hatchway,
or trap, without contributing to the
accident by his own negligence. Now
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the keeper of a tavern knows that
persons are liable to become intoxicated upon his premises; lie knows,
further, that idle men collected together, whether drunk or not, are apt
to indulge in skylarking, and it is
therefore incumbent upon him to see
that his guest has reasonable protection against the tricks, drunken or
otherwise, of his fellow guests, and the
duty would, it should seem, be all the
more binding upon him when the condition of the guest is such that lie is
unable to protect himself. Furthermore, it is to be remembered that the
innkeeper has thepowerand authority
toprotect hisguests; he isnotbound to
suiTor persons who misbehave to remainon the prenises: Comnionwcalthv.
-1itchell, 2 Pars. 431. He has the right
to eject them, and to call on the assistance of the police if unable to accomplish the ejection single handed. If,
then, an innkeeper invite persons to
come on his premises and nke no
eflbrt to protect them against injuries
from other guests of a character consonant with the risks ordinarily run

from the assemblage together of idle
or intoxicated persons, he cannot
complain if he be held liable. If lie
make no attempt to protect his giest,
lie cannot rely on the defense of ris
Major, such as in some cases is an answer to an action for the loss or
spoliation of the goods of a guest.
We have considered this case solely
as resting on the liability of an innkeeper, and we think that the court
did right in construing that liability
so as to include the present case. Of
course, if the act of injury were the
result of intoxication contracted on
the premises of the defendant, or there
aggravated by liquor sold by him, lie
would then be liable under the (Pa.)
Act of May 8, 1854, Pur. Dig. (ed.
1883) 1032, which resembles what
are known as the civil damage acts of
other States, and renders the furnisher
of liquor in violation of law to a
minor orin intoxicated person civilly
responsible for any injury to person
or property consequent upon such
furnishing.
IIENRtY BUDD.

Supreme Court of Illinois. November 9, 1887.
THE GREAT W1:iTERN TELEGRAPH COMPANY, FOR THE USE
OF ELIAS R. BOWEN, RECEIVER, v.F. D. GRAY.
The Great Western Telegraph Company was organized in 1867, under an
Illinois Act of 1849. In 1874 a court of equity appointed a receiver of the
company. In 1886 the same court made an assessment upon the subscribers
to the stock of the company to enable the receiver to pay its creditors. The
receiver then brought assoup~it against one Gray, a subscriber, to recover of
him the amount assessed by the court. Gray's contract of subscription was as
follows:
"Capital, $3,000,000. Shares, $25. Assessments not to exceed $10 on a share.
"Subscription List for the Capital Stock
of the
"Great Western Telegraph Company.
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"We, the subscribers hereunto, for value received, severally, but not jointly,

agree to take the number of shares in the capital stock of The Great Western
Telegraph Company placed opposite our respective names, and pay for the
same in installments, to wit: 5 per cent. on amount paid in and the balance
as the directors from time to time may order; in consideration thereof,
the Great Western Telegraph Company agree that when 40 per cent. of the par
value of the shares shall havebeen paid under such orders, and the installment
receipts therefor surrendered to the company, the number of shares severally
subscribed by the undersigned, shall be issued to them as full paid stock by
the said company.
" - is appointed agent to solicit stock and receive only the first installment of 5 per cent. (50 cents on a share) at the time of subscription.
Secretary.
Number of Shares.
Date of Subscription.
Residence.
"Names.
One hundred."
1868.
11,
June
Chicago.
"F. D. Gray.
Gray had paid 40 per cent. or $10 per share, and claimed that such
payment relieved him from further liability. Held,
1. That the words "assessments, not to exceed $10 on a share," do not
limit the liability of defendant to $10 a share; that the words "Capital,
$3,000,000; shares, $25," show no intention to reduce the capital stock or the
par value of the shares; that defendant's subscription is hence a clear and
unqualified promise to take and pay the par value of the shares, with which
the company's promise to issue certificates for the shares as full paid stock,
when 40 per cent. shall be paid, is not inconsistent.
2. That although the contract was made in 1868, it was to pay as the directors from time to time might order; that the court of equity appointing the
receiver stood in place of the directors; that the right of action for the
"calls" accrued when they became payable under the demand of the receiver,
made pursuant to the decree of assessment made by the court in 1886, hence
the action is not barred by the statute of limitation.
3. That the defendant in this suit brought upon the assessment could not
defeat it by objecting that he was not a party to the proceedings in equity in
which the assessment was made, inasmuch as the corporation was before the
court in those proceedings, fully representing defendant and all the other
shareholders. And as the directors, before the appointment of the receiver,
might have made the assessment, without bringing defendant before them, so
might a court of equity, standing in place of such directors, make the assessment without making defendant a party .to its proceedings. Chandler v.
Brown, 77 Ill. 333; Lamar Ins. Co. v. Gulick, 102 Id. 41, holding a different

rule, apply only to cases arising under the 25th section of the Illinois Corporation Act of 1872.
ERROR to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

T/oma
EBi

. Sutherland, for plaintiff in error.

Winters, for defendant in error.

SHELwDON, CH. J.-This was an action of assumpsit brought

162

THE GREAT WESTERN TEL. CO. v.F. D. GRAY.

lv The Great Western Telegraph Company for the use of Elias
iL liowen, receiver, to recover from the defendant the sum of
$875, being 35 per cent. of the par value of one hundred shares
of the capital stock of tel plaintiff company which the defendant had agreed to take and pay for. There was judgment for
tile defendant on a demurrer to the declaration, which judgment
on appeal was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Second
District, and from that judgment of affirmance the plaintiff
appealed to this court.
There had been an order of assessment of this amount of' 35
per cent., made upon the stockholders of the company by the
Circuit Court of ('ook County in a suit pending therein on the
chanceIy side thereof, wherein the company was a party defendant, and wherein a receiver had been appointed for the company.
The assessment was made by the court for the purpose of paying the debts due from the company, and after finding the
amount of those debts and the proper assessment to be made
pro rata upon the stockholders for that purpose, demand upon
defendant had been duly made for the payment of this money
before action brought. The unpaid balance on defendant's subscription was 60 per cent. of the par value of the shares agreed
to be taken by him. The declaration sets forth fully the above
aud other requisite facts, stating particularly the proceedings in
said chancery suit and giving a copy of the decree of assessment.
The subscription paper signed by the defendant as set forth in
the declaration is as follows :
"Capital, $3,000,000.

Sharcs, $25.

Assessments not to exceed $10 on a share.

"Subscrip ion List for the Capital Stock
of the
"Great Western Telegraph Company.
"Me, the subscribers hereunto, for value received, sererall , but not jointly;

agree to take the number of shares in the capital stock of I he Great IVestern
Telegraph Company placed opposite our respective names, and pay for the same
in installments, to-wit: 5 per cent. on amount paid in and the balance as the
direclorsfromtime to time may order; in consideration thereof, the Great Western Telegraph Company agree, that when 40 per cent. of the par value of
the shares shall have been paid under such orders and the installment receipts
therefor surrendered to the company, the number of shares severally subscribed by the undersigned, shall be issued to them as full paid stock by the
said company.
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is appointed agent to solicit stock and receive only the first
"
installment of 5 per cent. (50 cents on a share) at the time of subscription.
---- ----

Residence.
"Names.
"F. D. Gray. Chicago.

Date of subscription.
June 11, 1868.

Secretary.

Number of shares.
One hundred."

The declaration admits a payment of $10 upon each share
and avers a balance unpaid of $15 upon each share.
It is alleged by the defendant that the declaration does not
state a good cause of action in three respects.
1. That the contract of the defendant therein set forth is a
limited contract, and provides for the payment by defendant of
40 per centum of the par value of the shares subscribed for
by him and no more; that he paid said 40 per centum and is
not liable to pay any further sum.
2. That the plaintiff's right of action against defendant on
said contract is barred by the statute of limitations.
3. It does not appear by the declaration that the defendant
was a party to the proceeding in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, wherein the assessment was ordered.
The construction which defendant would place upon his contract, that the payment of 40 per cent. of the par value of
the shares is a full compliance, and that, having paid such 40
per cent., he is not further liable, is not admissible. Defendant's
promise to take and pay the par value of the shares is clear and
unqualified and binds him for the payment. The company's
promise when 40 per cent. is paid, to issue certificates for the
shares as full-paid stock, may well consist with the defendant's
promise to pay the par value of the shares, and the issuance of
such certificates after the payment of 40 per cent. may well
consist with the liability remaining on the defendant to pay the
other 60 per cent.
Such promise of the company, then, does not operate to
qualify that made by the defendant, and to limit his liability to
the payment of 40 per cent. of the par value of the shares.
To give it that effect, it should have been expressly so declared.
Nor, as we conceive, do the words at the top of the paper on
which the contract is written: "Assessments not to exceed $10
on a share," assist to limit the liability of the defendant to $10
a share. Assuming those words as incorporated into the con-
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tract, whatever their meaning may be, we cannot assign to them
any such effect as to in any way qualify the express promise
made by the defendant.
In connection and ol the same line with those words are also
these words and figures : " Capital, $3,000,000; shares, $25,"
showing no intention to reduce the capital stock nor the par
value of the shares. In (Uton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 43, the
stockholder had a certificate for the whole number of shares
agreed to be taken, and the word "non-assessable" together with
the amount "$100" were stamped across the certificate,
although only 20 per cent. had been paid ; and yet the
stockholder was held liable for the remaining 80 per cent.
There is nothing in the point as to the statute of limitations.
Although the contract was made in 1868, it was to pay as the
directors from time to time might order. The directors
neglected to make order for the payment. A court of equity
then might make the order in place of the directors: Scorill
v. Thayer, 105 U. S. 155; Gi'nn v. Saxon, 68 Cal. 353. The
order of assessment or call for payment made by that court was
in 1886. Until then, as we view it, the cause of action did not
accrue, and since then there has not been time for any period of
limitation to run. Scovill v. Tlayer, supra.
The claim of the necessity that the defendant should have
been a party to the proceeding in the Circuit Court of Cook
County to admit of this action against him is rested upon the
authority of the cases of Chandler v. Brown, 77 Ill. 333, and
Lamar Insurance Co. v. Gulick, 102 Id. 41.
The former case was a suit by Chandler, receiver of the Lamar
InsuranceCo.,v. Brown, a stockholder in the company, to recover
payment for his unpaid stock.
The proceeding wherein Chandler had been appointed receiver
and the order of assessment was made was under § 25 of
the Act of 1872, relating to corporations, which provided that
in the contingency therein named, suits in equity might be
brought against all persons stockholders at the time by joining
the corporation in such suit, and that each stockholder might be
required to pay his pro rata share of the debts of the corporaration; and the Lamar Insurance Company was being dissolved
and wound up under that section.
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It was then said by the court:
"It can hardly admit of argument that to conclude a stockholder by a proceeding under this section (25), it is indispensable that he should have been made a party thereto, as it provides. * * * * *
"It is incumbent on the plaintiff to show clearly a legal right
to institute and carry on the suit. To this end he should show
his appointment (as receiver) by a decree which is conclusive as
against the defendant. This he has failed to do; it nowhere
appears, either by the recitals in the decree copied in the several
counts or by distinct averment that the defendant was a party to
this proceeding."
And why should he have been a party to that proceeding?
Because, as had before been stated, the act so provides.
The decision was one merely upon the construction of
that § 25-what it provided-and is not to be taken as
authority to govern in any other case than in one arising under
that section. There was no purpose in that case to depart from
the well-established general rule that a court acquires jurisdiction to appoint a receiver of corporate assets by service of process upon the corporation. The stockholder is represented in
his interest as such by the presence of the corporation: 2 Morawetz Corp. § 822; Ward v. Farwell, 97 Ill. 593; Glenn,
Trustee, v. Williams, 60 Md. 93; Sanger v. Upton, Assignee, 91
U. S. 56.
Lamar Ins. Co. v. Gulick was a suit by this same Lamar Insurance Company against a stockholder to recover for unpaid
stock, and the court, after stating that the defendant not having
been made a party to the suit wherein the receiver was appointed,
as to the proceeding to procure an assessment, was not bound or
affected by the orders therein, say: "A case exactly in point in
principle is Chandler v. Brown, 77 Ill. 333. And as it is conclusive of this view of the law, it will not be necessary to discuss it as a new question in this court." So that the Gulick case
but followed and affirmed Chandler v. Brown, and goes to no
further extent as an authority than that case, namely, to decide
what is the requirement of § 25 of the law of 1872 as to
making the stockholders parties in a proceeding under that
section.
VoL. XXXVI.-22
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This Great Western Telegraph Company was organized in
the year 1867 under the law of 1849 in relation to telegraph
companies. The suit in chancery wherein this receiver, Bowen,
was appointed, and this assessment made, was commenced in
1869 and has ever since been pending, so that it was not affected
by the Act of 1872, and the provisions of that act did not govern
the proceedings therein. Tile decisions, then, in CLandler v.
Brown and Lainar Ins. Co. v. Gulick do not apply here, and we
do not regard the objection to the declaration that it does not
show that the defendant was a party to the proceeding wherein
the assessment was ordered, as vell taken. It is enough under
the general rule and the authorities above refbrred to that the
corporation was a party to that proceeding.
That suit was brought by one Terwilliger and certain other
persons, stockholders of the company, on behalf of themselves,
and all others similarly situated, against the company and others,
.as defendants. Tile declaration in the present case avers, and
the order of assessment appearing therein sets forth, that the
receiver was appointed in the said chancery suit of and for the
company and all its property on October 7, 1874, upon supplemental bill of complaint filed therein, and on account of the
mismanagement and malfLasance of the then officers of the
company; that the company was indebted to the extent of more
than $375,000, which indebtedness was in the form of judgments and decrees theretofbre rendered against the company,
and was duly proved by the creditors before and found to be
due by the court; that the company had no property except
the amounts remaining due upon stock subscriptions with which
any part of said indebtedness could be paid; that there were
about two thousand stockholders of the company widely scattered through more than twelve different States and Territories
of the United States and other places, and it was therefore
impracticable that all of the said stockholders should be made
parties to that proceeding, and it was found that it was necessary
and proper that 35 per centum of the par value of each share
of the capital stock subscribed for by the stockholders should be
called for and required to be paid by them for the purpose of
paying the said indebtedness, and it was therefore ordered that
a call or assessment of said amount of 35 per cent. be made,
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that it be paid to the receiver, and the receiver was ordered to
proceed at once to collect the sums so ordered to be paid, and
to institute suits in the name of the company for the purpose of
enforcing payments.
This order was made on July 10,
1886.
There was here, then, a receiver appointed by a court of
equity to collect the assets of the corporation for the benefit of
its creditors. The unpaid part of defendant's subscription to
the capital stock of the corporation was a part of such assets.
The validity of the receiver's appointment cannot be questioned
in this collateral proceeding. The court had jurisdiction of the
subject-matter, and acquired jurisdiction to appoint the receiver
Defendant's
by service of process upon the corporation.
promise was to pay as the directors from time to time might
order.
The directors, who were defendant's agents, having neglected
to make order for payment, a co. -t of equity in their place, as
before said, might make the order. The court here did make
such order, and thereupon, or at least after demand made,
defendant's legal liability upon his contract was complete to pay
the remaining amount of his stock subscription. There was,
then, a perfect cause of action against him. His liability was
to pay the entire remaining unpaid amount of 60 per cent. of
his subscription, at least to the extent needed to pay the debts of
the corporation. Assessing him only his ratable part thereof,
35 per cent., was in mitigation of his legal liability, doing him
an equity, and affording no just cause of complaint. In order
for the board of directors to have made a valid order for payment, it would not be contended, we presume, that defendant
should have been before the board. No more, we conceive, was
it necessary that defendant should have been before the court,
when it, in place of the directors, made the call or order of
assessment.
We are of opinion the declaration shows a good cause of
action, and that the demurrer to it was improperly sustained.
The judgments of the Appellate and Circuit Courts will be
reversed, and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court.
Judgment reversed.
Cn.AiG and SHoPp, JJ., dissent.
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CON-STRUCTION

OF CONTRACTS OF

SunscnRTiox.-The contract of subscription to the stock of a company is
often before the c torts in cases wherein it is sought to compel payment of
unpaid balances due on shares by takers thereof. It is settled that, wherethe subscription is written, the written
contract determines the rights and obligations of the subscriber. Parol
evidence is not admissible to vary or
contradict the writing: Corwith v. Cutrer, 69 111. 502; Grosse Isle H1otel Coampany v. Anson's Executors, 43 N. J.
Law 442. The reasons underlying
ti's rule are the usual reasons for refusing to admit parol evidence to vary
or contradict written contracts, and
one reason peculiar to this kind of
contract, viz.: that to admit parol evidence to vary a contract of subscription, as by showing a condition would
work a fraud upon other subscribers
not taking the stock upon the condition and having no knowledge of it.
It would be fraudulent, too, as to
creditors of the company.
Where the words of the written
subcription are plain, positive, and
unambiguous, there is no room for
construction. The words must be
taken as they read, and in their ordinary, usual signification: Foster v.
City of Joliet, U. S. C. Ct. N. Dist. Ill.,
June 9, 1886, 27 Fed. Rep. 899; Long
v. 31illerton Iron Co., Ct. App. N. Y.,
Jan. 26, 1886; Coghlanv. Stetson, U. S.
C. Ct. S. Dist. N. Y., March 17,188,
17 Reporter 485; People v. Wall, 88
Ill. 78; Cooley's Const. Lim. and Cases
cited 55. Exceptions or qualifications cunnot be injected into the contract by construction. Every presumption, therefore, is thatasubscription to capital stock purporting to
call for payment of the full par value
of the stock is a contract for that kind
of payment.
What is the plain meaning of a

clause like "assessments not to exceed $10 on a share" printed on a
certilicate? Clearly not that the stocks
shall be taken as fully paid when $10
a share is paid in. If this were meant,
the proper way to express the idea
would be to print across the certificate
a clause like "$10, paid on each share,
as called for, shall I.e full payment for
the shares," or "The total of all assessments shall not exceed $10 on a
share," and even then there might
be some doubt whether $10 per share
would fully pay fr the stock. The
more likely meaning of the phrase
first quoted, is that while assessment
after assessment may be made until
the par value is paid in, none of the
assessments shall exceed Q10 a share.
If this clause could be taken to exonerate sharetakers from liability
for more than $10 per share, the effect of it would be to reduce the capital stock of the company down to that
sum per share. But such reduction
of the capital stock of the company
would be a fraud upon its creditors,
ultra vires, and hence void. See State
v. Timken, 48 N. J. Law Rep. 87;
Zirkel v. Joliet Opera House, 79 Ill.
334; Bank of Commerce's Appeal, 73
Pa. St. 59 ; Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.
S. 45; Union Mutual L. . Go. v. Frear
Stone Co., 97 Il. 537; M3'dien v. Lamar
Ins. Go, 80 Id. 446; Griswold v. Seligman, 72 Mo. 110; Gill v. Balis, 72 Id.
424; ChouteauIns. Co. v. Floyd, 74 Id.
286; Board of Commissioners v. La
Fayette, etc., B. B. Co., 50Ind. 85; Baile
v. . . E. Society,47 Md. 117 ; C6andoll v. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 73; Clapp v.
Peterson, 104 111. 26; CYereland Iron
Co. v. Ennor, S. Ct. Ill., Jan. 25, 1886.
In State v. Tinken, supra, the subscribers to the capital stock of a telegraph company, upon payment of
$8.33 per share, caused to be issued to
themselves shares of fill-paid stock of
the par value of $25. At the same
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meeting of stockholders, it was resolved that 150 shares of the stock be
issued to the relators for services alleged to have been rendered by them
to the company, without any account
or statement of the amount due the relators. .held, that in such case the
presumption was that full-paid stock
was to be issued upon payment of only
$S.33 per share, which was illegal, and
to the enforcement of such illegality
the court would not lend its aid by
mondamus or otherwise.
In connection with the question of
the meaning and eflect of the clause,
"As. esssments shall not exceed $10 on
a share," ,hould be read the opinion
in Upton v. Tribilcock- 91 U. S. 45.
In that case the certificates had the
word " Nou-assessable" together with
the amount, " 100," stamped across
them. The court said:
'"The legal efiect of this instrument
was to make the remaining 80 per
cent. payable upon the demand of the
company. We see no qualification of
this result in the word 'non-asscssdble,'
assuming it to be incorporated into
and to lorm a part of the contract.
It is quite extravagant to allege that
this word operates as a waiver of the
obligation created by the acceptance
and holding of a certifi.cate to pay the
amount due upon his shares. A
proini.e to take shares of stock imports a
promis' to pay for them. Vihc same effect
resultsjfio an acceptance and holding
of a cctifcate: .Pancrv. Learence, 3
Sand S. C. 761; Brigham v. .Jead, 10
Allen 245. At the most, the legal
effect of the word in question is a stipulation against liability to further taxation or assessment after the holder
shall have fulfilled his contract to pay
the one hundred per cent. in the manner and at the times indicated. We
cannot give to it the consequence of
destroying tile legal effect of the certificate!'
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Power of a court of equity to 2nake
"calls" itpon stockholders. There is no
question but that a court of equity,
having acquired jurisdiction of a corbenefit of creditors,
poration for tile
may make assessment upon stockholders for unpaid balances due the
company in payment for stock. The
court thus acting has the same powers
as the directors had, and its orders
have the same force and effect -s the
resolutions of the board of directors
would have had before the court took
jurisdiction by its receiver: Upton v.
Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45; l|ebster v.
Urpton, Id. G5 ; s. c., 15 Ail. Law lIeg.,
N. S., 638; Snger v. Tjrton, 91 U. S.
56. The court has the power to make
all assessment or call for any portion of
the unpaid balances due on subscriptions to the stock of the company, for
the payment of the corporate debts,
provided the assessment is pro rata:
Lamar Ins. Co. v. Jloorc, 84 Ill.
575; Patterson v. Lynde, 112 Id.
208.
.hust all the shareholders be inade
parties to the suit in w'hich a court of
epaity decrees or orders an asse.smcnt
against tifmn2 The first point to be
noted in this connection is the impossibility, in the absence-at least of some
statutory mode of service, of bringing
the subscribers before the court in
cases where they are numerous. In
the principal case it is believed that
they numbered two thousand, scattered
allover the country. It is an impossibility to reach so many defendants,
and it ought not to be required. The
directors making an assessment would
not be required to bring all the stockholders before them, and why should
a court acting as the directors be required to do this?
Looking at the decisions, Patterson
v. Lynde, 112 Ill. 196, is noteworthy.
That case appears to hold that it is
not necessary, whether practicable or
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not (except where the corporation
has ceased to exist), that all the stockholders should be before the court of
equity when that court makes an assessment on the unpaid stocks for the
purpose of paying the debts of the
corporation, and that the corporation
is alone necessary. The language of
the court is this:
"To enforce the liability of the
stockholder for his unpaid stock, in
equity, therefore, it is indispensable
that the corporation(or if it has ceased
to exist, all its stockholders and creditors) should be before the court, so
as to be bound and concluded by its
action. A decree that one stockholder
thould pay, or that one creditor should
be paid, must be partial and incomplete, and might be grossly inequitable and unjust; and a decree assuming to affect the rights of parties;
where there is neither jurisdiction of
the person nor of the entire subjectmatter of the litigation, can, at most,
be only partially effective."
Next to be read are the Glenn
cases: Glenn v. Williams, 60 Md. 93
Glenn v. Soule, U. S. C. Ct. E. Dist.
La.. 22 Fed. Rep. 417; Glenn v. Springs,
U. S. C. Ct. W. Dist. N. C. Dec. T.
1885, 26 Fed. Rep. 494; Glenn v.
S&mlie, 80 Ala. 159 ; Glenn v. Saxton,
S. Ct. Cal., Jan. 21,1886. In these cases
Glenn was seeking to recover from the
stockholders of the National Express
& Transportation Co. the amount of
$30 upon each share of the stock of
the company subscribed for by them,
and which they were severally assessed and ordered to pay by a court
of equity in Richmond, Virginia,
upon a bill filed to compel them so to
do. The corporation was a party defendant to this bill, and was brought
into court, but none of the stockholders. This assessment was first
pronounced valid and binding by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, in

Glenn v. Williams, 60 Md. 93. The
court examined the question whether
stockholders were necessary parties in
such a proceeding at considerable
length. It concluded, in substance
(the decision is too lengthy for quotation here), that when the court obtained jurisdiction of the corporation,
every stockholder in his corporate capacity was a party to the cause, and
was supposed to be represented by the
president and directors, who were intrusted with the management of the
corporate interest of all the stockholders; that if they neglected their
duty in allowing claims to be established against the corporation that
ought to have been defeated, the
stockholders must have themselves to
blame for not having a more active
and efficient board of directors; that
if the decree were to be held void
because the stockholders were not
parties to it, the creditors would be
without adequate remedy, since stockholders scattered all over the country
were practically beyond the reach of
the court. Having in mind the legal
theory that stockholders' unpaid balances were trust funds held by them
for creditors, the court argued that
the proceedings were conclusive
against the corporation and should be,
in the absence of fraud or collusion,
against those who held its property
or funds in trust for the payment of
its debts. Reliance was placed upon
the decision in Hall v. U. S. Ins. Co.
5 Gill 484, and Sanger v. Uplon, 91
U. S. 56. "Both on principle and
authority," said the court, "therefore
we conclude that the defendants cannot successfully defend this action
upon the ground that they were not,
in their individual capacities, parties
to the decree that made the assessment and authorized the bringing of
the action." And such is undoubtedly
the law. See also Morawetz on Corp.,
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222, notes; Scorill v. Thayer, 105
U. S. 143.
Statute of Linitations.-Withreference to this defense but little need be
said. Where asubscription does not
become payable until a call or demand
is made, the right of action for collection of the assessment does not arise
until the call or demand has been
made, and the statue of limitation does
not begin to run until the right of action accrues: Banctv. Alton &St. Louis
.l . Co., 13 Ill. 513; Spanglerv. Id. &
Ill. Cen. 1. R. Co., 21 Id. 276; Ode v.
Joliet Opera House Co., 79 Id. 96;
Glenn v. Williams, 60 Md. 03; Glenn
v. Scmple, SO Ala. 159; Glenn v. Springs
et al., U. S. C. Ct. W. Dist. N. C. Dec.
T. 1US5, 26 Fed. Rep. 494; Glenn v.
Saxton, 68 Cal. 353; Allibone v. Bagr
46 Pa. St. 48; Carry v. Woodward, 53
Ala. 371; larmon v. Page, 62 Cal.
448; Falmouth & L. T. Co. v. Shaw-

han, 107 Ind. 47; Gibson v. The 0. &
X. 1B. T. & B. Co., IS Ohio St. 396;
Sco'ill v. Thayer, 105 U. S. 143,155.
We have examined but two or
three of the -many questions arising
out of the efforts of sharetakers to secure the benefits of their subscription
and to shirk its responsibilities. In
conchsion, we may quote the language
of SHERWOOD in Fisher v. Seligrman,
75 Mo. 26:
"There have been many devices,
many schemes, many cunningly devised transactions, whereby men have
sought to receive every benefit, and
yet shirk every burden incident to
the position of a stockholder; but
such devices have generally come to
naught. The eour~s have been sedulous in their endeavors to bring about
such a result."
ADEiLERT I

IILTON.

Chicago, Nov. 15, 1SS7.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
McDONALD v. STATE.
The act approved February 28, 1337, which requires all railroad engineers
engaged in running a train of cars or engine used for the transportation of persons, passengers, or freight on the main line of any ra*road in this State
to be examined and licensed by a board appointed by the governor and makes
it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and hard labor, for any engineer to act
in that capacity without such examination and license, is not a regulation of
interstate commerce, but an internal police regulation which the State had undoubted power to enact as a law.
The said act does not confer judicial powers on the board of examiners, nor
does it deprive the citizen of his liberty or property without due process of
law.

APPEAL from City Court, Montgomery county.
Prosecution for operating locomotive engine without license.
Lorenzo McDonald, the appellant, was arrested on affidavit
before the County Court of Montgomery and upon conviction
therein appealed to the City Court of Montgomery. The corn-
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plaint filed in the latter court charged that "lie, being an engineer of a railroad train in said State, did drive, operate, or engineer a train of cars or engine upon the main line or road-bed of
the Western Railway of Alabama, which said Western Railway
was a railroad in said State and was at the time used for the
transportation of persons, passengers, or freight, without having
first undergone an examination and obtained a license as required
by law." A second count in the indictment charges the same
offense, concluding, "without first having applied to the board
of examiners provided by law, to be examined by said board,
and without having first been examined by said board or by two
or more members thereof, in practical mechanics and concerning
his knowledge of operating a locomotive engine and his competency as an engineer as required by law." The defendant
pleaded not guilty.
The evidence tended to show that on May 24, 1887, the
defendant was an engineer in the State of Alabama, on a railroad
therein; that he was not nor had he been so employed in said
State previous to January 28, 1887; that lie had never applied
to the board of examiners provided by law nor been examined
nor obtained a license as an engineer; that on said May 24,
1887, he operated an engine and train in said State on the 1Vestern Railway of Alabama and in the county of Montgomery;
that the Western Railway of Alabama was and is operated under
one management with the Atlanta and West Point Railroad in
the State of Georgia, the two railroads forming a continuous
line from Iontgomery, Alabama, to Atlanta, Georgia, for the
transportation of passengers and freight and the United States
mail; that said train, so operated by defendant, was a through
train from Atlanta to Montgomery; that said engine and train
were and are used in transporting freight shipped from Atlanta
and points beyond to Montgomery and points beyond in the
State of Alabama and in other States west and south of the State
of Alabama.
This being substantially all the evidence, the court refused to
give the general charge at the request of defendant and gave the
general charge at the request of the State. The defendant excepted to such actions of the court. Verdict and judgment having been rendered against the defendant, he appeals to this court.
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The first two sections of said act are as follows: "§ 1. That
it shall be unlawful for the engineer of any railroad train in
this State to drive or operate or engineer any train of cars or
engine upon the main line or road-bed of any railroad in this
State which is used for the transportation of persons, passengers,
or freight, without first undergoing an examination once and
obtaining a license as hereinafter provided. § 2. That before
any locomotive engineer shall operate or drive an engine upon
the main line or road-bed of any railroad in this State used for
the transportation of passengers or persons or freight, he shall
apply to the board of examiners hereinafter provided for in
this act and be examined by said board, or by two or more
members thereof, in practical mechanics and concerning his
knowledge of operating a locomotive engine and his competency
as an engincer." Acts Ala. 1886-87, pp. 100-102.
7)-oy, Tompkins & Loudon (with whom were Ttos. G. JTones
and Geo. 1. .Harrison),for appellant.
T. X. iMeClellan, Atty.-Gen., contra.
SO MERVILLE, J.-The Act of 1886-87, pp. 100-102, requires
locomotive engineers in this State to be licensed after examiation as to competency and fitness by a board authorized to be
appointed by the governor for that purpose. Acts 1886-87,
pp. 100-102. It is insisted that the act is unconstitutional for
several reasons.
The first objectiofi is that it is a regulation of commerce between the State3. and for this reason violative of the clause of
the United States Constitution which vests in Congress the power
to regulate such commerce. In our opinion it is a mere internal
police regulation which was competent to be provided for by the
State as a proper mode of preserving the safety of the traveling
public and other persons whose lives may well be imperiled by
the negligence of ignorant and incompetent engineers. It incidentally affects interstate commerce but does not amount to a
regulation any more than laws licensing, by State authority,
pilots of vessels engaged in such commerce which have always
been held free from constitutional objection. The laws of the
several States have undertaken not only to license pilots in such
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cases, but have gone so far as to regulate the whole subject of
pilotage and pilots; fixing their qualifications, employment, and
pay, including the tender of services, and, on refusal to employ,
authorizing the recovery of half pay. These laws have been
sustained not on the ground that Congress had recognized them
as valid, for it is clear that no such recognition coul confer any
constitutional power on the States which they did not already
possess, but upon the ground that they were necessary police
regulations, having in vie~v the public safety, or, if regulations
of commerce in a certain sense, they were local regulations of
such a nature as to be permissible until Congress itself undertook to exercise the same power by legislating on the subject:
Cooley v. Board of IVardens of Philadelphia,12 How. 323 ; Ex
parte lViel, 13 Wall. 236.
There are many police regulations of this nature incidentally
affecting commerce which have been sustained by the courts. It
is well settled that the States may pass laws requiring railroads
running from one State to another to fence their tracks, to ring
a bell, or blow a whistle on approaching a crossing or highway,
to erect gates or bridges, and keep flagmen at dangerous
places on highways, to stop for reasonable times at certain stations, to fix and post printed time-tables, rates of fare and
freights, and other things of like character, having reasonably in
view the prevention of fraud and extortion or other injury and
the preservation of the safety of the public: Railroad Co. v.
Fuller, 17 Wall. 560; 11.obile, etc., R. Co. v. State, 51 Miss. 137 ;
Coin. v. Eastern B. Co., 103 Mass. 254 ; People v. Boston & A.
R. Co., 70 N. Y. 569 ; Railroad Con'rs v. Portland, etc., R.
Co., 63 Me. 269; Davidson v. State, 4 Tex. App. !45; Tied.
Lim. Police Powers, § 194; Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th ed.) *579
et seq.
The exaction of a license in such a case does not impose a
direct burden upon interstate corn merce or interfere directly with
its freedom. It only "acts indirectly upon the business through
the local instruments to be employed after coming within the,
State." It does not belong to that class of subjects which are
national in their character and admit of but one system of regulation for the whole country, having in view the prevention of
unjust discrimination and the preservation of the freedom of

McDONALD v. STATE.

transit and transportation from one State to another: Wabash,
etc., Bi7y. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, and cases there cited.
The case of Robbins v. Shelby Co. Taxing District, 120 U. S.
489, does not conflict with the foregoing views. The license
there exacted of foreign drummers was held to be a tax on interstate commerce. It was not a police regulation. Even in that
case the stronger reasoning, in our judgment, is with the able
opinion of Chief Justice WAITE, concurred in by Justices
In Port of Mobile v. Leloup, 76 Ala. 401,
FIELD and Gnrxy.
we sustained as constitutional an ordinance of the port of lobile imposing a license tax upon a telegraph company doing
business in that city between this and other States which was
interstate commerce. In this we followed as authority the case
of Osbornc v. .Xobile, 16 Wall. 479, in which the United States
Supreme Court sustained a similar license on an express company under like circumstances. The same question had been
before decided in Southern Eap. Co. v. _Mayor, etc., _fobile, 49
Ala. 404. In City of lVw Orleans v. Eclipse Tow-Boat Co., 33
La. Ann. 647, in like manner, a city ordinance exacting a license
fee from the owner of tow-boats running on the Mississippi
River to and from the Gulf of Mexico, was held not unconstitutional as a regulation of commerce upon authority of the same
decision.
In Ameican Union, Tel. Co. v. T. U. Tel. Co., 67
Ala. 26, we held that the provisions of our Constitution prohibiting foreign corporations from doing business in this State without having at least one known place of business and an authorized agent therein, was a legitimate exercise of the police power,
and was not a regulation of commerce.
The case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, does not, in our
opinion, lend any favor to the contention of appellant. The
municipal ordinance there pronounced invalid vested in the
board of supervisors the arbitrary power to license public
laundries at their own mere will and pleasure, without regard to
discretion in the legal sense of the term, and without regard to
thefitness and competency of the persons licensed or the propriety of the locality selected for carrying on such business. Properly construed, this case favors the views above expressed by us.
2. The other objections to the law based on constitutional
grounds, are, in our opinion, not maintainable. It does not con-
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fer judicial power on the board appointed by the governor nor
does it deprive the citizen of his liberty or property without due
process of law. The vesting by legislative authority of the
power to license various occupations and professions requiring
skill in their exercise or the observance of the law of hygiene or
the like, have never been construed to be obnoxious to these
objections. It has been uniformly held that laws providing by
accustomed modes for the licensing of physicians, lawyers, pilots,
butchers, bakers, liquor dealers, and, in fact, all trades, professions, and callings, interfere with no natural rights of the citizen
secured by our Constitution : Miayor, et,., 31obile v. Iille, 3
Ala. 137 ; Dorsey's Case, 7 Port. (Ala.) 295; Cooperv. Schultz,
32 How. Pr. 107, and authorities cited ; Coe v. Schultz, 47
Barb. 64 ; JIetrol)olitanBoard of Health v. -Heister,37 N. Y.
661 ; Reynolds v. Schultz, 34 How. Pr. 147 ; People v. MIedical
Society of N. Y., 3 Wend. 426 ; Metropolitan Board of Excise v.
Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657: Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27;
Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, Slaughter-House Cases,
10 Wall. 273.
The rulings of the court accord with these views and the
judgment is affirmed.
General Principles.-In Mobile v.
Kiniball, 102 U.S. 691, commenting
upon the commercial clause in the
Federal Constitution, the court said:
"The subjects, indeed, upon which
Congress can act under this power are
of infinite variety, r ,quiring for their
succes4ul management different plans
or modes of treatment. Some of them
are national in their character and require uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the Statei; others are local or are mere aids to commerce and
can only be properly regulated by
provisions adapted to their special
circumstances and localities. Of the
former class may be mentioned all
that portion of commerce with foreign
countries or between the States which
consists in the transportation, l'rchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. Here there can of necessity be

only one system or plan of regulation
and that Congress alone can prescribe.
Its non-action in such cases with respect to any particular commodity or
mode of transportation is a declaration of its purpose that the commerce
in that commodity or by that means
of transportation shall be free. There
would otherwise be no security against
conflicting regulations of different
States, each discriminating in favor of
its own products and against the products and citizens of other States."
In Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing
District, 120 U. S. 489, the court said:
"It is also an established principle, as
already indicated, that the only way
in which commerce between the States
can be legitimately affected by State
laws, is when by virtue of its police
power and its jurisdiction over persons and property within its limits, a
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State provides for the security of the
lives, limbs, health, and comfort of
persons and the protection of property; or when it does those things
which may otherwise incidentally affect commerce, such as the establishment and regulation of highways, canals, railroads, wharves, ferries, and
other commercial facilities; the passage of inspection laws to secure the
due quality and measure of products
and commodities; the passage of laws
to regulate or restrict the sale of articles deemed injurious to the health or
morals of the community; the imposition of taxes upon persons residing
within the State or belonging to its
population and upon avocations and
employments pursued therein, not directly connected with foreign or interstate commerce or with some other
employment or business exercised
under authority of the Constitution
and laws of the United States; and the
imposition of taxes upon all property
within the Sta-e mingled with and
forming part of the great mass of
property therein. * * * And no discrimination can be made by any such
regulations adverse to the persons or
property of other States; and no regulation can be made directly affecting
interstate commerce.
It thus appears that the power of
Congress to regulate commerce is exclusive upon subjects of a national
character, requiring uniformity of
regulation; while upon subjects of a
local nature, theState may legislate in
the absence of conflicting Federal
legislation. When Congress assumes
to regulate subjects of the latter class,
such regulations supersede those of
the State: Spraigue v. Tlompson, 118
U. S. 90; Morgan v. Louisiana, 118
Id. 455; Pensacola Td. Co. v. West
Un. Tel. Co., 93 Id. 1 ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; The Clymene, Dist.
Ct, E. Dist.Pa., Oct. 12,1881, 9 Fed.

Rep. 164; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22
How. 227.
While the foregoing principles have
been generally recognized, it is impossible to harmonize all the conflicting decisions with any well defined
general rules. In Hall v. De Cair,
95 U.S. 48-5, the court said: "The
line which separates the powers of the
States from the exclusive power of
Congress is not always distinctly
marked and oftentimes it is not easy
to determine on which side a particular case belongs. Judges not unfrequently differ in their reasons for a
decision in which they cncur. Under such circumstances it would be a
uselqss task to undertake to fix an arbitrary rule by which the line must
in all cases be located. It is far better
to leave a matter of such delicacy to
be settled in each case, upon a view
of the particular rights involved.'
2. Pilotage-In the absence of Federal legislation, it is competent for the
State to pass laws regulating pilotage,
providing for licensing pilots, fixing
their qualifications and pay, requiring
vessel owners to employ them, and
even to pay for their services when
tendered though not accepted: Milson v. cframee, 102 U. S. 572; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 ;
1n re MclNeil, 13 Wall. 236. The
power to regulate pilotage, however,
is included in the power of Congress
to regulate commerce, and Federal
regulations on the subject are controlling. Thus a pilot-boat licensed in
Delaware under Federal laws may
pilot vessels into Pennsylvania ports
despite the conflicting laws of' the
latter State: The Clymene, supra. See,
also, Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S.
90.
3. Bridges and Dams.-Unless Congress interferes, the State may authorize the construction of bridges across
navigable streams and the passage of
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ordinances to regulate them. When
deemed best for public interests, it may
even close such streams by permitting
the erection of dams and bridges without draws: Escanaba Co. v. Chicago,
107 U. S. 678; Pound v.Turck, 95 Id.
459; C4,-dwdll v. Bridge Co., 113 Id.
208, 422; 117lson v. Black-bird,etc.,
Co.,
2 Pet. 245; Atkinson v. P. & T. R. Co.,
Id. 252; U. S. v. .feoBedford Bridge,
1 Wood. & 'M.401 ; Hatch v. 11radlament
Bridge Co., 7 Sawy. 127; People,v..P.
& S. R. Co., 15 Wend. 113. See, also,
Gilnan Y. Philadelphia,3 Wall. 713.
4. HarborImprorements.-Theplacing of buoys and beacons, the removing of obstructions, erection of
wharves, etc., are proper exercises of
the police powers of the State: 31obile
v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 ; Packet Co.
v. Catlettsburg, 105 Id. 559.
5. Harbor .Requlations, etc.-" Local
authorities have the right to prescribe
at what wharf a vessel may lie, and
how long she may remain there,
where she may load or take on board
particular cargoes, where she may
anchor in the harbor and for what
time, and what description of light
she shall display at night to warn tihe
passing vessels of her position and
that she is at anchor and not under
sail:" Cushing v. Ship John Iraser,21
How. 184; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg,
105 U. S.559.
State laws requiring logs floated on
navigable waters to be rafted, and
laws providing for compensation for
injuries to persons and property on
board vessels or along the shore of
such waters, are not unconstitutional:
Scott v. Willscn, 3 '-. 11.321; Sherlock
v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; Johnson v. C.&
P. EleratorCo., 119 Id. 388.
6. Whaifage.-A duty of tonnage is
a tax levied for the mere privilege of
entering and doing business in a harbor. and is not only such a regulation
of commerce as the State may not im-

pose, but is also expressly forbidden
elsewhere in the Federal Constitution.
But the charging of a reasonable compensation for the use of a public
wharf by a ve---l engaged in interstate or foreign commerce is permissible, and such a charge is not a duty
of tonnage, thongh it is proportioned
to the tonnage of the vessel: Ouachita
-Packet CO. v. Aikin, 121 U. S. 444;
TransportationCo. v. Pakersburg, 107
Id. 691; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg,105
Id. 559; Packet Co. v. St. L,uis, 100
1d. 423; Vicksbury v. Tbin, 100 Id.
430; Packet Co. v. Kieokuk, 95 Id. 80;
Cannon v. Xew Orleans, 20 Wall. 577.
An ordinance providing for the
collection of wharfage fees ofsuch vessels only as bear the products of other
States, is a discrimination against such
products and is unconstitutional:
Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434.
7. Begmlation of Carriers.-State
laws requiring railroads to fence and
otherwise guard their tracks, to provide suitable depots and depot facilities, to erect bridges and construct
grades and cros-sings in a prescribed
manner, regulating the running of
trains, providing for the fixing and
posting of schedules of ratesare proper
exercises of the police power: State
v. C., St.P., 11&O...Co , 19 Neb.476;
People v. B. & A. B. Co., 70 N. Y.
569; Railroad Co. v. FaUller, 17 Wall.
560; Cooley, Const. Lim., 579, 580.
A State law providing a penalty for
the failure to transmit properly telegrams has been declared constitutional even as applied to telegrams
sent out of the State: MVest. Un. Tel.
Co. v..Ferris,103 Ind. 91. Likewise
a statute forbidding railroads to limit
their liability as common carriers:
Hart v. C. &X. 1'. By. Co., 69 Ia. 485.
Likewise a statute providing a penalty for charging grcater rates than
the bill of lading called for, and for
refusing to deliver the goods: L. B.
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& F. By. Co. v. Ifanniford,S. Ct. Ark.,
June 25, 1887.
A statute which abrogates the common law remedies for the wrongful
exclusion of passengers on railroads
is unconstitutional so far as it relates
to the carriage of persons across State
lines: Brown v. N. & C. B. Co.,
C. Ct., W. Dist. Tenn., Oct. 30, 1880,
5 Fed. Rep. 499. So is a statute requiring railroad companies to transfer
freight and passengers at the termini
of their lines only: Council Bluffs v.
K. C., St. J. & 0. B. 1. Co., 45 Ia. 338.
So is a State law which requires common carriers to carry colored passengers in the same apartments with
whites: Hall v. De Cair. 95 U. S.
485. So is a statute regulating the
order of sending and delivery of telegrams: WVest. Un. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 Id. 347.
A State may fix the maximum rates
to be charged by public warehouses
for storage and by common carriers
for the transportation of goods and
passengers, and prevent unjust discrimination, when the transportation is wholly within its limits. A
number of cases seem to hold that the
State possesses the same power to regulate rates for a carriage from points
without to points within, and from
points within to points without the
State. It is now settled, however,
that the statute of a State which
attempts to regulate the fares and
charges by railroad companies within
its limits for a transportation which
constitutes a part of commerce among
the States is obnoxious to the Federal
Constitution: IF., St. L. & P. By. Co.
v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 ; s. c. 105 Ill.
236; Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co.,
116 U.S. 307; C, B.& Q.B. Co.v.
Iowa, 94 Id. 155; Peil v. 0. & N. I. By.
Co., 94 Id. 164; C., M. & St. P. R. Co.
v. Acley, 94 Td. 179; W. & St..P..
Co. v. Blake, 94 Id. 180; .Nunnv. lli-

nois, 94 Id. 113; H. & 0. B. Co. v.
Sessions, C. Ct. S. Dist. Miss., Sept.
1, 1886, 28 Fed. Rep. 592; Pacific
Coast Steamship Co. v. B. Commissoncrs, C. Ct, Dist. Cal., Sept. 17.
1883, 18 Id. 10; Keeiser v. I. Cent.
B. Co., C. Ct., S. Dist. Iowa, Oct.
24, 1883, 18 Id. 151; L. & .. B.
Co. v. B. Commissioners, C. Ct.,
Al. Dist. Tenn., Feb. 29, 1881, 19
Id. 679; Carton v. . C. B. Co.,
59 Ia. 148; s. c. 22 Am. L. Reg.
373; State v. C. & V. IV. By.
Co., 70 Ia. 162; Hardy v.A., T.&S.
F6i B. Co., 32 Kan. 698. See, also,
Bailroadv. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456;
The .DanielBall, 10 Id. 557.
8. Sanitary and Inspection Laws.State sanitary and inspection laws
are not invalid because they may affect, incidentally, interstate or foreign commerce. Thus a statute requiring the masters of vessels from
abroad to register, under oath, within
twenty-four hours after landing, a list
of the passengers, their ages, occupations, and last. legal settlements, is
valid : IVw York v. .lfiln, 11 Pet. 102.
So is an ordinance of St. Louis, requiring boats coming from below
Memphis at certain seasons, and carrying above a certain number of passengers, to remain in quarantine fortyeight hours: St. Louis v. McCoy, 18 Mo.
238; St. Louis v. BoFinger, 19 Mo.
13. Statutes forbidding the importation of diseased cattle, or forbidding, under reasonable conditions,
the importation of all cattle from
diseased districts, are valid. Wilson
v. K., C. St. .". & U P. B. Co.,
60 Mo. 187; Yeazd v. Alexandria,
58 Ill. 254; Sterens v. Brozen, 58 Ill.
289. An inspection law of Maryland,
requiring all tobacco shipped out of
the State to he brought to a State
warehouse and marked, was declared
constitutional: Turmer v. .fa-yland,
101, U. S. 38.
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A quarantine law, requiring vessels
entering the port of New Orleans to
be inspected and to pay the examining officer a fixed reasonable fee, was
held to be an exercise of the police
power not forbidden by the Federal
Constitution: Morgan v. Louisiana,
118 U. S. 455. So, also, a statute requiring the inspection of corpses before being shipped from the State
and the payment of an inspection fee:
In re Wong Yung Quy, 6 Sawy. 442.
The State cannot, under the guise
of sanitary and inspection laws, impose a tax on interstate or foreign
commerce, or discriminate against the
products of citizens of other States or
countries. A tax upon passengers
entering or leaving a State is a tax
upon commerce and invalid, and it
makes no difference that the tax is
levied on the vessel or other carrier,
or that it is for the purpose of paying
the expenses of enforcing the quarantine laws: People v. Pac. J1Mail Steamship ao., 8 Sawy. 640; People v. Campagnic Ggngrale Transatlantique, 107
U. S. 59.
A statute prohibiting the importation of Texas and Indian cattle from
March to December is unreasonable,
a discrimination against the products
of other States, and unconstitutional:
.H.&St.J. B. Co.v..Husen, 95 U. S.
465.
9. Prohibitions on Manufacture and
Sale.-Laws which forbid the killing
of game during certain seasons of the
year, and prohibit the sale of the same
during a like period, whether killed
in the State or elsewhere, are not invalid as an interference with the
power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States: .Magner v.
People, 97 111. 320; Phelps v. Racey,
60 N. Y. 10; State v..Randolph, 1 Mo.
App. 15.
A statute is not void because it provides for the condemnation of vessels

found taking oysters illegally, though
applying to vessels licensed as coasters under Federal laws: CorJidd v.
Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371.
A statute prohibiting the ianufiteture and sale of oleomargarine as food
was declared constitutional: .1n re
Brosnahan, C. Ct., W. Dist. Mo., June,
SS3, 18 Fed. Rep. 62; Potrell v.
Coanonirealth,114 Pa. St. 265.
The prohibition of the inanufficture
of intoxicating liquors for sale either
within or without the State is constitutional: Pearsonv. InternationalDistillery, S. Ct. Iowa, Sept. 10, 1887.
It is competent for the State to
license or altogether prohibit the sale
of intoxicating liquors. It has been
said, obiter,that the prohibition of the
sale of intoxicating liquors by the
importer in the original package is
an interference with the exclusive
power of Congress to regulate commerce; but it is conceded that when
the iported package has either
passed from !he importer or been
broken up, the sale may be prohibited: Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586 ;
State v. Pwbinson, 49 Me. 2S5 ; State v.
Allmond, 2 Iloust. (I)el.) 612. We
incliie to the belief that even a sale
by the importer in the original package may be prohibited: Dorman v.
State, 34 Ala. 216; State v. Fourlugs,
58 Vt. 140. See, also, Grores v.
Slaugler, 15 Pet. 449. A prohibitory
law which discriminates in favor of
native wines is invalid, to the extent,
at least, of the exception: Wel v.
Calhoun, C. Ct. N. Dist. Ga., Dec. 16,
1885, 25 Fed. Rep. 865. Contra, State
v. Stueker, 58 Ia. 496.
10. Monopolies. - A State cannot
grant the exclusive privilege of navigating the waters of the State as
against vessels licensed by the United
States and engaged in interstate commerce, nor the exclusive privilege of
erecting and operating telegraph lines
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as against telegraph companics operating under Federal laws: Gibbon v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; PensacolaTl. Co.
v. Wet. Ein. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1. See,
also, Conway v. Taylor's Err., 1 Black
603.
11. Taxation.-Imported products
cannot be taxed until they become a
part of the common mass of property
in the State. It is said that they do
not become such until they pass from
the hands of the importer, or the
original package is broken up for sale
or use: Bobbins v. Shelby County Tax.
Dist., 120 U. S. 489; Cook v. .Pennsyltvnia, 97 Id. 566; Waring v.lMayor, 8
Wall. 110; Brown v. Maryland, 12
Wheat. 419; Peoplev. Haring, 3 Keyes,
374; Hinson v. Lott, 40 Ala.123. See,
also, C.e v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; The
License Qascs, 5 how. 504. It seems
to have been held that the products
of sister States become part of the
common mass of property and subject
to taxation upon arrival at their destination: Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S.
622; Hinson v. Loft, 40 Ala. 123.
There canbe no question that a tax
imposed upon the products of another
State or country not imposed on similar domestic products, whether levied
directly or indirectly, as by requiring
auctioneers, traveling salesmen, or
others selling them to take out a
special license, is unconstitutional:
Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344;
Cook v. Pennsylrnia,97 Id.566; Walton v. Missouri, 91 Id. 275; Guy v.
Baltimore, 100 Id. 434; Ward v.
Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Tiernan v.
Rinker, 102 Id. 123; In re Watson,
Dist. Ct. Dist. Vt., Dec. 1, 1882.
15 Fed. Rep. 511; Jackson Mining
Go. v. The Auditor Gen. 32 Mich.
488; State v. Furbush, 72 Me. 493;
State v. North, 27 Mo. 464; Daniel
v. Richmond, 78 Ky. 542; Mfarshalltown v. .Blum,58 Ia. 184; Van Buren
v. Downing, 41 Wis. 122; Ex parte
VoL. XXXVI.-24

Thomas, 71 Cal. 204; Fecheimer v.
Louisville, Ct. App. Ky., Oct. 2,1886.
It was long supposed that a uniform
drummer tax, applicable alike to residents and non-residents, to domestic
products and those of other States,
was constitutional: Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123; .Hinson v. Lott, 8
Id. 148; J11achine Co. v. Gage, 100 U.
S. 676; Er pare Thornton, 4 I-Iughes
C. C. 220; In re Rudolph, U. S. C. Ct.,
Dist. Nevada, March 1880, 2 Fed.
Rep. 65; Ex parte Hanson, U. S. Dist.
Ct. Ore., June 24, 1886, 28 Id. 127;
Territory v. Farnsworth,5 Mont. 303;
Ex parte Asher, 27 Am. Law Rleg.,
N. S. 77; Speer v. Commonwealth, 23
Grat. (Va.) 935. But it now seems
to be settled that interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even
though the same amount of tax
should be laid on commerce carried
on solely within the State, and to
the extent that it affects interstate
commerce a "drummer tax" is invalid: Bobbins v. Shelby County Tax.
Dist. 120 U. S. 489; Lbrson v. MLfaryland, 120 Id. 502; Simmons Hardware
Co. v. MeGuire, S. Ct. La., June 20,
1887.
Statutes imposing a " head tax" on
alien passengers, or on vessels for
landing them, or forbidding the landing of passengers of certain classes,
and providing that the vessel landing
them shall give bond that they will
not become a burden on the State, or
imposing a tax on the number of passengers carried from the State by
common carriers, and like taxes, are
unconstitutional: .- enderson v. Mayor
of N. Y., 92 U. S. 259; C(,y Lung v.
Freeman, 92 Id. 275; Steamboat Co. v.
Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31; Passenger
Cases, 7 How. 283; .ead Mloney Cases,
112 U. S. 580; Crandall v. N'crada, 6
Wall. 35; Webb v. Dunn, 18 Fla. 721.
A license tax on foreigners working
gold mines has been upheld: People
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v. Xglec, 1 Cal. 232. But a tax on
all foreigners residing in a State, not
engaged in certain occupations, is
void: Lin Sing v. Mfashburn, 20 Cal.
534.
Vessels, cars, locomotives, and other
instruments of commerce may be
taxed as other property where registered or owned, though engaged partly
or wholly in interstate or foreign
commerce; but no license or other
tax can be imposed on them for the
privilege of entering or doing business
in the ports of another State, or of
transporting freight or passengers
therein, so far as such transportation
relates to interstate commerce: Pickard v..Pullman Car Co, 117 U. S. 34;
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania,
114 Id. 196; Wiggins FerryCo. v. East
St. Louis, 107 Id. 365; Transportation
Co. v. Tl7teeling, 99 Id. 273; Hays v.
Pa. Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596;
Minot v. P. IF. & B. 1. Co., 2 Abb. C.
C. 323; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall.
471; St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11
Id. 423; Gunther v. Baltimore, 55 MId.
457; New Orleans v. Eclipse Tow-Boat
Co., 33 La. An. 647, s. c. 39 Am. Rep.
279 ; TV. P. C. Trans. Co. v. Wheling,
9 W. Va. 170.
A State has the power to require
foreign insurance companies and other
corporations to establish offices, take
out licenses, pay fees, etc., before
doing business in the State; but it
cannot compel corporations engaged
in interstate commerce to comply

with such requirements: Coper 21.,.
. IF.
Co. v. Ferguson, 113 727;
.R. Co. v. Commowealth, S. Ct. Pa.,
Oct. 4, 1886 ; Indiana v. Pullman Car
Co., C. Ct. Dist. Indiana, March 8,
183, 16 Fed. Rep. 193; Paul v.
Tirginia,8 Wall. 168.
A tax on the number of passengers
or tons of freigli carried by railroads,
or on telegrams, is void, so far as it
relates to passengers or freight carried
acros State lines, or messages sent to
or received from points without the
State: Telegraph Co. v. Tczas, 105 U.
S. 460; E. .y. Co. v. State, 31 -N. J.
L. 531; B. ly. Co. v. Pcnnsylrania,
15 Wall. 284; P. 1. Co. v. Pennsylinia, 15 Id. 232.
Taxes on the gross receipts of railroad and telegraph companies, and
license taxes on the business of telegraph and express companies, not
intended or used to obstruct business,
have been declared valid, though
incidentally affecting interstate commerce: Osborne v. Mllobile, 16 Wall.
479; M. & L. 1. B. Co. v. X'olan,
C. Ct. W. Dist. Tenn., Sept. 9, 1832,
14 Fed. Rep. 532; 1R. R. Co. v.
Pennsylvani,,,15 Wall. 284; l'uacott v.
People, 17 Mich. 68; Mobile v. Leloup,
76 Ala. 401; SJ. Express Co. v. Mobile, 49 Id. 404; fest. T5h. Tel. Co. v.
Jiayer, 28 0. St. 521; see, however,
Fargo v. Mt1ichigan, 121 U. S. 230;
Indianav. Am. Express Co., 7 Biss. 227.
CseAs. A. RoBINs.
Lincoln, Neb.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
WELLINGTON v. APTHORP, ADM't.
A valid oral contract may be made to leave a certain sum of money by will
to a particular person, in consideration of services thereafter to be rendered by
the promisee to the promisor, provided such services are in fact thereafter
rendered and accepted in pursuance of such contract, although the promisee
did not bind himself in advance to render them. The performance of the
consideration renders the contract binding, and gives a right of action upon it.
A, a brother-in-law of B, had for several years advised the latter as to the
investment of her property, and managed it for her; the latter at one time
stating to A. that he should have a proportion of the profits of one transaction, but nothing was in fact paid to A. Subsequently B told A that if he
would continue to act as her agent and adviser, she would make a will leaving
to her sister (.'s wife) $5,000, or, in the event of the latter's death, would
leave $5,000 to A. Afterward, upon A's wife becoming fatally ill, B asked A to
accompany her to California and Nevada, and, with the knowledge of A's
wife, destroyed a will in which she had bequeathed $5,003 to the latter, and,
in 1878, made a new will, giving to A $5,000. After the death of A's wife,
A went with her to California and Nevada, being gone several months. Upon
his return lie married again, without B's knowledge, and when the latter
heard of the marriage she revoked the will made in 1873, and made another
will, giving A nothing. Held, in an action against B's administrator, that
the facts showed a contract on the part of B to leave A $5,000, which might
be enforced against B's administrator.
CONTRicT against the defendant, as administrator with the
will annexed of the estate of Mary Chism, deceased, upon an
agreement, as the plaintiff alleged, made by her with the
plaintiff on or about May 23, 1878, to bequeath to him, by her
last will, the sum. of $5,000, and pay his expenses of a journey
to California and Nevada in accompanying her there ill the fall
of 1878 ; and also upon an account annexed, for services in
managing her property, in accompanying her to California and
Nevada, and for cash paid as expenses on said visit. Hearing
in time Superior Court of Suffolk County, before Bacon, J., who
found for the defendant, and upon the plaintiff excepting, reported the case for the determination of the Supreme Judicial
Court. The facts are stated in the opinion.

J. S. Patton,for plaintiff.
A. 31. Rowe and T. J. lomer, for defendant.
C. ALLEN, J.-It is not contended, on behalf of the defendant, that a contract, founded on a sufficient consideration, to
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make a certain provision by will for a particular person is invalid in law. The contrary is well settled: Jenkins v. 'tetson,
9 Allen 128, 132; Par'kerv. Coburn, 10 Allen 83; Canada v.
Canada, 6 Cush. 15; Parsellv.Stryker, 41 N. Y. 480; "_lm
'lpson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. St. 161 ; Updike v. Ten Broeck, 32 N. J.
Law 105; Caviness v. RBshlon, 101 Ind. 502.
Nor is it contended that a contract to leave a certain amount
of money by will to a particular person, though oral, is open to
objection under the statute of frauds. It is not a contract for
the sale of lands or of goods, and it may be performed within
a year: Peters v. lle-'tboroitgh, 19 Pick. 304; Fenton v.
.Emblers, 3 Burrows 1278; Ridicy v. Ridley, 34 Beav. 478 ;
Kent v. Kent, 62 N. Y. 560 ; Bell v. Hewitt, 24 Ind. 280;
TVallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522. Such a contract differs
essentially from a contract to devise all one's property, real and
personal, which comes within the statute of frauds: Gould v.
Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408. The obligation of such a contract is
not impaired, though the consideration is to arise wholly or in
part in the future, and though the person to whom the promise
is made is under no mutual, binding obligation on his part. In
Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. 380, 385, it was said by Mr. Justice
WILDE that "if A promised to B to pay him a sum of money
if he will do a particular act, and B does the act, the promise
thereupon becomes binding, although B, at the time of the
promise, does not engage to do the act." This doctrine was
quoted with approval in Gardnerv. IWebber, 17 Pick. 407, 413,
and in Bornstein v. Leans, 104 Mlass. 214, 216 ; and it is also
affirmed in Goward v. Maters, 98 lass. 596. In Cottage
Street Church v. Kendall, 121 Mlass. 528, 530, it was held that,
"where one promises to pay another a certain sum of money
for doing a particular thing, which is to be done before the
money is paid, and the promisee does the thing upon the faith of
the promise, the promise, which was before but a mere revocable
offer, thereby becomes a completed contract, upon a consideration
moving from the promisee to the promisor; as in the ordinary
case of the offer of a reward." See, also, Paige v. Parker,8 Gray
211, 213 ; Hubbard v. Coolidge, 1 Mete. 84; Todd v. Teber,
95 N.Y. 181, 192 ; Miller v. licfKen=ze, Id. 575, 579. It is
therefore in law competent for a valid oral contract to be made
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to leave a certain sum of money by will to a particular person,

in consideration of services thereafter to be rendered by the
promisee to the promisor, provided such services are in fact
thereafter rendered and accepted in pursuance of such contract,
although the promisee did not bind himself in advance to render them. The performance of the consideration renders the
contract binding, and gives a right of action upon it.
The objection mostly relied on by the defendant in the present case is that the auditor's report does not conclusively show
such a contract, upon such a consideration. The auditor does
not in terms, as lie might properly have done, make any specific
finding upon the question whether there was such a contract;
but lie states the facts in detail upon which he considered that
question to rest, and leaves the determination of it to the court.
The detailed facts stated by the auditor are not controverted, and
the evidence upon which they were found is not before us.
These facts are therefore to be taken as they stand, with no further explanation than is afforded by the circumstances.

Looking

at them in this manner, it is to be determined whether on the
whole there is enough clearly and decisively to show that there
was a contract so that the judge who heard the case could not
properly find the contrary; in other words, whether it appears
there was a promise by the defendant's testator sufficiently defi-

nite to be enforced, and made with the understanding and intention that she would be legally bound thereby. A promise made
with an understood intention that it is not to be legally binding,
but only expressive of a present intention, is not a contract:
lhiurston.v. Thornton, 1 Cush. 89 ; Chit. Comm. (11th Amer.
ed.) 12, 13.
Ordinarily, when there is a distinct promise for a sufficient
consideration to do a particular thing, such a promise is to be
considered as a contract, unless there is something in the subject

of the promise, or in the circumstances, to repel that assumption.
But each must be examined in the light of its own circumstances.
In the present case it appears that the plaintiff was the brotherin-law of the defendant's testator, wbo was an unmarried woman;
that he was early in the habit of advising with her about her
business affairs, and not, at the outset, if ever, in the expectation
of being paid directly for his services. Nevertheless there soon
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came to be a recognition on her part that the plaintiff's services
were valuable in a money sense, and an intention in some form
to pay him for them. By his advice, in 1866, she bought real
estate on Chauncy street, and sold it again in 1868 at a profit of
$10,000, the sale being advised and negotiated by him. 'Prior
to the sale, she told him that, if such profit should be made, he
should have one-half or a part of it. In fact, nothing was paid
to him at this time, but it appears that she already contemplated
putting the relation between them on a business basis; and shortly
afterward she told him that, if he would go on and act as her
agent and adviser respecting her investments, she would make a
will giving his wife $5,000; and, in the event of his wife dying
before him, she would then, by a new will or codicil, bequeath
the legacy of $3,OGO to him. He assented to this, and she made
her will accordingly, bequeathing $5,000 to his wife. All this
savored of a business arrangement. The sum mentioned was
not greater than she bad talked of paying to him, as a part of
the profits on the sale of the Chauncy street real estate; indeed,
not so great, for that was to be payable in 1868, while the bequest would not be payable till after her death. In 1868 another
purchase was made of real estate, which was sold at a profit in
1869. In 1869 he admitted her to share in a purchase of real
estate on Bedford street, which he had intended to make on his
own account; the whole of the money was furnished by her;
and in 1873 and 1874 the estate was sold at a profit of between
$4,000 and $5,000, over and above the allowance to her of 7 per
cent. interest on the purchase-money, and this profit was equally
divided between them. In 1876 a purchase was made of real
estate on Aft. Vernon street. All of these purchases and sales
were negotiated and advised by the plaintiff, and were made
solely upon his judgment.
Such were the relations of the parties up to 1878. She had
paid him nothing for his services; but her will bequeathing
$5,000 to his wife had stood during all this time according to
the understanding between them in 1868. Nothing had been
said or done to vary the effect of her promise to bequeath the
legacy of $5,000 to him in the event of his wife dying before
him. In 1878 a new arrangement was made. The plaintiff's
wife was fatally ill, and died in June of that year. A few weeks
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before her death, and when it had become apparent that she was
fatally ill, the defendant's testator told the plaintiff that she desired to visit California and a brother who resided in Nevada,
and, if he would accompany her there in the fall of that year,
she, in consideration of his so accompanying her, and of the
services he had rendered and might thereafter render her respecting the management of her property, would make a will giving
him $5,000, and pay the expenses of the journey. The plaintiff
assented thereto, and in May or June of that year she destroyed
the will then existing and executed a new one, wherein she gave
to him a legacy of $5,000. According to the terms of what she
had proposed in 1868, she was, by a new will or codicil, to bequeath to him the legacy of $5,000, in the event which was now
at hand, if he would go on and act as her agent and adviser respecting her investment. This he had done up to that time.
She now proposed to him that she would make a will giving
him $5,000 in consideration of his accompanying her to California and Nevada and of the services he had rendered and
might thereafter render to her. There was no stipulation binding
him to render such services for any particular length of time in
the future. The most that could fairly be implied is that he
should render them as requested and as long as he should be
able to do so. Her proposition appears to have been intended
as in the nature of business. The relations between the parties
in the past had not been merely those of kindness and voluntary
aid. The services which he had already rendered were substantial and of a buginess character. They did not consist merely
of advice, but he appears to have taken, to a large extent, the
responsible charge of her business matters, and to have conducted
them successfully. In addition to continuing such services, he
was now asked to accompany her to California, which he did, in
the fall of 1878 and the winter following-a trip of several
months. She proceeded at once to act upon his acceptance of
her proposition, and made a new will accordingly. This new
will remained unrevoked for two and one-half years. In view
of all these circumstances, it seems to us that, upon a just construction of the auditor's report, there is not enough to repel the
ordinary assumption that the promise of the defendant's testator
was qi contract which, when made, was intended and understood
by both parties to be binding upon her.

188

WELLINGTON v. APTIIORP, ADM'R.

The present case materially differs in its facts from 111addisom
v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467, 5 Exch. Div. 293, and 7 Q. B.
Div. 174. In that case doubt was expressed whether there was
a contract, but the question was not finally determined. It depended in part upon a review of the testimony of witnesses
which is not fully reported. The terms of the alleged promise
and consideration differed from those in the case before us in
certain respects, which might be found to be material. But the
decision in that case turned finally upon the question whether,
assuming a contract, it had been shown that there had been a
part performance sufficient to take it out of the statute of frauds,
and it was held in the negative.
Upon the auditor's report in the present case, we must now
assume that the whole consideration stipulated for was performed
by the plaintiff and that it was sufficient. It is expressly found
that his advice was valuable and his management judicious,
being given and rendered whenever requested or required ; that
lie has received no compensation therefor, except as stated, respecting the division of the profits arising on the sale of the
Bedford street real estate; that in the fall of 1878 and the
winter following he accompanied her to Nevada and California,
"and then and thereafter in all respects complied with and fulfilled the aforesaid agreement."
It is also suggested in behalf of the defendant that, even
assuming a contract, it was not proved to be a contract to make
a will which should not be revoked. But looking at the language used, in the light of the circumstances existing and
preceding, so narrow a construction of the contract is not permissible. The substance of it was that she would bequeath to
him the sum mentioned. An instrument effectual as a will was
clearly contemplated; otherwise the promise was but illusory.
The result is, in the opinion of a majority of the court, that
the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the sum of $5,000 and
interest, in addition to the amount found at the trial. Exceptions sustained.
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Ever since the case of Osborn v.
2%e Governors of Greys Hiospital, 2
Strange 728, the law has been that
where one has rendered services in
expectation of receiving a legacy, he
cannot recover for them when lie has
been disappointed. And the jury
were told in that case "that they
should find how it was understood by
the parties at the time of the doing of
the business" The plaintiff attended
to the decedent's stock transactions,
acting not as a broker but merely as
a friend, in the expectation apparently of being remembered in the
will, and when lie discovered that no
provision had been made for him, he
brought suit for his services. If,
therefore, it appears from the evidence that the decedent made a contract to compensate services rendered
him by a provision in his will, and he
fails to do so, suit can be brought to
recover for the breach of the contract;
but if the one who renders the service does so voluntarily, in the expectation of a provision by will, there
is no contract and he cannot recover.
A contract to leave money by will,
as it does not concern land and may
be performed within a year, does not
fall within the statute of frauds, and,
therefore, may be oral.
The principle of law being perfectly plain, the question in most of
the cases is whether or not there is a
contract, and the tendency of the
courts, in this country at least, seems
to be in the direction of finding a contract wherever it is possible to do so
from the evidence and the services
have been rendered in good faith.
Some of the cases may afford interesting illustrations of this.
In Grandin's .Errv. The Adm'r of
Beading, 2 Stockton's Ch. R. 370, C,
when nearly eighty years old, went to
reside with R, her son-in-law. She
had about $1,500, which R at her
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request, invested for her. After living there about three years, she made
a will in which most of her property
was left to her daughter, R's wife.
When about eighty-five years of age
C was taken by her son to live with
him, and two months after her change
of residence she made a new will,
leaving R's wife a legacy of $200, and
the rest of her property to her son,
and shortly after this died. R presented a claim against C's estate for
board, and it was allowed. The court
state the above facts and say: "It is
very certain that R expected his wife
to be the principal beneficiary under
C's will, and he had a right to. C
had lived with him nearly eight
years, and had been tenderly cared
for, but she forgot the obligation she
was under to those who had watched
over her old age. Her age and situation account for this without attributing it to her ingratitude. These
considerations can do R no good in a
legal point of view, but they are of a
character to induce a court to look at
his claim with a favorable eye. The
law implies a contract on her part to
remunerate him. To deprive him of
the benefit of that implication, the
court should be satisfied that he
looked alone to C's will for remuneration and intended to rely solely
on her generosity."
In Snyder et ux. v. Castor's Adm'r,
4 Yeates (Pa.) 353, a daughter, after
she came of age, lived with and rendered services to her father's family,
and he declared to several persons
that she should be paid for her services
after his death. He madea will leaving his daughter £3, which he declared she should forfeit if she made
any claim for her services. It was
held that the rule of law that one
who serves another in expectation of
a legacy cannot recover is not applicable in a case where the decedent
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promises to pay for the services, and
it is immaterial whether the promise
was made before or after the services
were rendered.
Where the decedent requested the
services there can be a recovery, no
matter what expectations the party
performing them may have had.
In Jones v. Jincey, 9 Gratt. 708, a
suit for services was brought against
the one who had received them, and
upon her death continued against her
estate. The court state the facts and
the law as follows: "The evidence
shows that the services rendered were
performed with a view to a legacy
and not in the expectation of a reward in the natur of a debt. The
claimant assigns as a reason for suing
his aunt that she had made a will
and set all her negroes free, and that
he had left a good situation to come
and attend to her business and she
could not expect him to attend to it
for nothing when she had left him
nothing by her will; that she had
promised if he would come and live
with her and attend to her business
she would do as well orbetter for him
than he was then doing. It was
proved that until claimant was living
with testatrix, he expressed a doubt
whether she ever would make a will
and said, if she did not, he thought
it probable he would not get paid for
his services. There was evidence
that when some of claimant's friends
urged testatrix to provide for her
nephew, she replied that she would do
as well for him as he would do for
her, and she refused todo anythingat
that tme. Before the claimant came
to live wit" testatrix she said that she
had written to him to come to live
with her and that he would lose
nothing by giving up his situation
and coming to her, as all she had was
for him and his sister on her death;
that she wanted him to take charge

of her matters and she would do as
well for him as he was dtdng in his
situation. She sutsequently stated
that her nephew had come and was
then attending to her affairs. The
evidence proves no contract, but a
mutual expectation that the claimant
would receive a reward in the shape
of a provision by will, but as testatrix
requested the services and did not
compensate them in the nanner expected by both parties, the claimant
should receive compensation as a
creditor."
In Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich. 247, a
claimfor$1,00 was presented againsan estate. The fac:s were that decet
dent took thleclaimant-his nephewwhen about fourteen years old, into
his family and treated him as his
own childuntil he became twenty-one,
during which time V e nephew's services on the farm were of more value
than the cost of his board. After he
came of age, the claimant worked a
farm of decedent's on shares and put
upon it many valuable improvements.
This the decedent encouraged him to
do, and said that at his death all lis
property would be divided between
the claimant and his brother. Many
of the improvements, however, were
paid for by decedent. I he decedent
afterward gave the claimant this
paper, "This is to certify that I do
agree to let C (the claimant) have a
claim on the farm he now occupies
to the amount of $1,000 if J should
die before 1 make a will;" and subsequently to this deeded the farm to
the claimant. The claimant's evidence proved that the $1,000 mentioned in the agreement was not
allowed on account of the purchasemoney, but for services and i j provements. The claim was allowed.
In Catiness v. Rushton, 101 Ind. 500,
the plaintiff had, at decedent's request,
lived with him and performed services
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for several years, when a settlement
was m.ide and it was discovered that
lie owed her$2,000. He then agreed
to leave her by will the amount found
due and gave her this paper, "I promise C to give her $2,000 at my death,
to take care of her children with,
which she claims of my estate. She
has been in my family nineteen years,
and a faithful servant, and it is my will
to her." This was held to be an agreement to make compensation by will,
and an action would lie for a breach
of it.
In Jaobson v. Ex'r of Le Grange, 3
John. 199, a nephew, at his uncle's request, went to live with him, and lie
promised to treat him as his own
child. Ie lived there eleven years,
and the uncle repeatedly said that he
should be one of his heirs, and talked
of advancing a sum of money to purchase a farm for the nephew as a compensation for his services; but the
uncle died without making any provision by will. The nephew was allowed to recover for his services.
In .3fartin v. Wriglh's Adm'r, 13
Wend. 460, the decedent had expressed his intention, frequently, of
paying for the services of the claimant,
who was his son-law, by making a provision in his will for claimant's children, and actually did make a will,
leaving them a legacy. At his death
no will could be found, and the estate
was held liable to make compensation
for claimant's services.
Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. St. R.
161, was a suit against an executor for
compensation for services as nurse,
under a contract to make provision by
will. The claim was for $10,000, for
ten years' services. The decedent was
a very old man and partially paralyzed, and the plaintiff did all the
housework, attended to his money
affairs, and transacted all his business.
The evidence was to the effect that

decedent had said that if plaintiff
would stay with him he would reward
her for it in the future, and would
provide for her after his death so
that she would not want; that he
intended to provide abundantly for
her, so that she might have plenty to
live on after his death if she was not
able to work; that he repeatedly
asked her to stay with him and do his
work and promised that she should
have full and plenty after he was gone;
that he would leave her independent
of all work. Decedent left the plaintiff in his will a legacy of $2,000,
which was paid her. The plaintiff
recovered. The court held that
where services are gratuitously rendered under expectation of a legacy,
there can be no contract and therefore
no recovery; but where the services
are rendered on request there can be
a recovery, no matter what the expectations may have been. That the
promise to the plaintiff was, " If she
would stay with him as long as he
lived, he would provide and give her
full and plenty after lie was gone, so
that she need not work," and was sufficiently certain and definite. The
measure of the amount would be what
would keep her without work, taking
into consideration her condition in
life.
Mere exprecsions of gratitude for
services rendered will not imply an
agreement to pay for them. In _iartman's .Appeal, 3 Grant (Pa.) 271, the
testator went to live with H as a
friend, and remained there about six
years, during which time lie broke
his leg, and continued in a somewhat
helpless condition until his death.
ie was kept in a room by himself and
received from 11 all the attention
that an invalid would require. He
frequently spoke of the troubie he
was to Ii, and said he must be paid
for it if it took all of his estate. H.
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received from testator's will about
half his estate, but presented a claim
for services. The court held that no
contract had been proved, and said:
"Certainly, at first, it was not contemplated that board and attendance
should be charged for, and it appears
from conversations between testator
andII that the services were to be
recompensed by a legacy. Under the
circumstances the law does not imply
a contract, and the evidence of such
promise must be clear and positive.
That which may be only an expression of intention is inadequate for the
purpose. It must have been the purpose of the decedent to assume a legal
obligation, capable -f being enforced
against him. The ordinary expressions of gratitude for kindness to old
age cannot be tortured into contract
obligations."
The contract must be certain. In
Shernan v. Shernian, 17 S. & R. (Pa.)
45, a promise to give plaintiff 100
acres of land was held to be uncertain. "The promise," say the court,
"is as boundless as the terrestrial
globe." And in Graham v. Graham's
Ex'r, 34 Pa. St. I. 475, a promise to
give plaintiff in consideration for services "as much as to any relation on
earth" was held too indefinite. "The
testator did not intimate what or how
much he would give to any relation he
had on earth!'
The principal case seems to advance a step beyond the other cases
and to hold that a contract to make
provision by will for services thereafter to be rendered may be made
binding by the performance of such
services and the acceptance thereof in
pursuance of such contract, although
the promisee did not bind himself in
advance to render them. The pr.-nciple invoked in this case seems to be
recognized and approved in some of
the recent cases.

In .Mfarie v. Garrison,83 N. Y. 14,
the complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners in their own
right, and as trustees with full
power of disposal, of shares of railroad stock. That an action to foreclose a third mortgage on the road,
brought in the interest of defendant
G, who owned a greater part of the
bonds secured by the mortgage, was
pending, which certain stockholders
were defending because the bonds
were collusive and fraudulent. That
plaintiffs had filed a petition to be allowed to defend in said foreclosure
suit, when G, with a view to compromise, promised by letter, in consideration of the relinquishment by plaintifis of further opposition to the
foreclosure, in case he purchased the
road, that lie would, upon plaintiffs
organizing a successor company and
complying with certain conditions,
convey the road to them. Plaintiffs
performed the preliminary obligations contained in said agreement,
and G, in consequence thereof, procured a decrep of foreclosure and a
sale of the road. After the making
of said agreement and in consideration of the surrender of a letter (containing G's promise) by plaintiffs,
and of their consent to a modification
of the terms of the agreement, G
agreed that, in case of a foreclosure,
he would become the purchaser, and
would forthwith organize a successor
company and convey the road to it,
and would issue to plaint'fis, in return for their stock, an equal amount
of the paid-up stock of the new
company. The road was purchased
for the benefit of G, a newv company
was organized, to which the property
was conveyed, but G refused to perform his agreement to issue new
shares in exchange for plaintiffs'
stock. Hdd, That the complaint set
forth a good cause of action; a suffi-
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cient consideration for the original
promise was alleged; and the surrender of the option given thereby to
plaintiffs was a sufficient consideration for the substituted agreement.
"It is not essential," say the court,
"to the existence of a consideration
for a promise, that mutuality of obligation should exist between the parties at the time of the making of the
promise. Where a proposition is
made by one accompanied by a
promise, a voluntary performance by
another, to whom the proposition was
made, of the requirements in consideration of the promise constitutes a
consideration which will uphold the
promise and make it binding."
In Miller v. McKenzie et al., 95 N.
Y. 575, it is held that a promissory
note; given in consideration of future
services to be rendered by the payee,
upon the rendition of the services in
reliance thereon, becomes valid and
binding, although there was no agreement at the time of the giving of tile
note on the part of the payee to
render them, and although the
amount of the note is much greater
than their value.
In Storm v. U.S , 94 U. S. 83, an
action was brought by the U. S. on
bonds given by plainrtiffs under a
contract to furnish supplies to the
army. The defense set up was that
the agreements accompanying the
bonds were not binding, because not
mutual. The court held "that where
a defendant has actually received the
consideration of a written agreement,
it is no answer to an action against
him for a breach of his covenants to
say that the agreement did not bind
the plaintiff to perform the promises
on his part therein contained, provided it appears that the promises in
question have been performed in
good faith and without prejudice to
the defendant."

The courts of England seem to have
more difficulty than those of America
in discerning a contract in tIle evidence of what the parties "understood." We may fairly take as an
expression of the English view of the
law the case of Afaddison v. Alderson,
8 Appeal Cases (L. R.) 467, decided
in the House of Lords in 1883. The
case was decided, it is true, upon the
point that, as thesupposed contract related to lands, there was not a sufficient part performance to take,it out
of the statute of frauds, but in all of
the opinions it was held that there
was no contract between the parties.
The facts were that an intestate induced a woman to serve lhim as his
housekeeper without wages for many
years and to give up other prospects
of establishment in life by a verbal
promise to make a will, leaving a
life estate in land, and afterward
made a will making this provision for her, but the paper not
being duly attested could not be admitted to probate. Tile facts of the
case are contained in the opinion of
the Lord Chancellor, and are stated
by him as follows: "The plaintiff,
having been in the intestate's service
for several years, contemplated leaving him and had some idea of being
married, and so informed him. She
had ten years before begun to leave
wages in his hands, and the arrears
accumulated from time to time, by
reason of his straitened circumstances,
until a large amount remained end
her. The intestate told her of his
exrectations from an uncle, and that
his uncle wished her to stay with him
as long as he lived, and wished him
to make her all right by leaving her
acertain manor, which he promised to
do if she remained with him. 'And
so, therefore, I took his advice and
remained by his promises, and did not
leave because he advised me not?
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She did not afterward press him for

wages, but, after his death, brought an
action for them against his administrator, which was discontinued!'
"The case," continues the Lord
Chancellor, "thus presented, is mani-

festly one of conduct on the appellant's part induced by promises of

her master to leave her a life estate
by will, rather than one of definite
contract for mutual considerations
made between herself and him at any
particular time. There was certainly
no contract on her part which she
would have broken by voluntarily

leaving his service at any time during
his life; and I see no evidence of any
agreement by her to serve without or

release her claim to wages. If there
was a contract on his part, it was

conditional upon and in consideration
of a series of acts to be done by her,
which she was at liberty to do or not
to do, as she thought fit, and which, if
done, would extend over the whole
remainder of his life. If he had dismissed her, I do not see how she

could have brought any action at law
or obtained any relief in equity."
As to the point that there was an

estoppel by reason of intestate's representations, his lordship says: "I
have always understood that the
doctrine of estoppel by representation
is applicable only to representations
as to some state of facts alleged to be,
at the time, actually in existence, and
not to promises in futuro, which, if
binding at all, must be binding as
contracts!'
It would rather seem that the difficulty was in not finding a contract in
the evidence in this case. The relationship was one which implied an
obligation to pay for the services.
The rendition of the services was requested by the intestate and a promise
made that if they were continued a
provision would be made by will, and
the intention and understanding of
the master is shown by his actually
making a will to carry out his
promise. It is certainly not to the
point to say that the servant was not
obliged to remain and perform the
services, when in point of fact she
actually did do so.
WILLumr

H. Bunxm-i.

Philadelphia.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
HAWKINS v. ROCKFORD INSURANCE CO.
A limitation on the powers of an agent of an insurance company, brought
to the knowledge of the insured, is binding upon the latter

AcTIoN on a policy insuring against fire. The loss, if any,
was payable to a mortgagee named, as her interest should
appear. The policy provided that if any of the property insured by it should thereafter become mortgaged or in any
manner incumbered, "without the consent of the secretary of
the company, in writing," then and in every such case it should
become void. It also contained this language: "It is expressly
provided that no officer, agent, or employee, or any person or
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persons, except the secretary, in writing, can in any manner
waive either or any of the conditions of this policy, which is
made and accepted upon the above express conditions." During the life of the policy, the mortgage upon the premises when
it was issued was discharged, and another mortgage was executed. This remained in force when the property was burned.
Plaintiff claimed to recover because the local agent of defendant gave verbal consent to the execution of the second mortgage.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CASSODAY, J.-The mere fact that the mortgage to Pease,
mentioned in the policy, had been paid and discharged, (lid not
authorize the plaintiff to place another mortgage, running to a
different party, upon the premises insured, in violation of the
conditions of the policy above mentioned. Such conditions in
policies "are to secure risks in which there shall be no motive
for intentional or dishonest loss :" Rtdmon v. Pani.v Ins. Co.,
51 Wis. 301. True, the mortgage here is small, but to hold
that the plaintiff had a right to put it upon the premises in contravention of the agreement without jeopardizing the risk
would be to establish a rule which would authorize a large mortgage with the same impunity. The question was submitted to
the jury whether the plaintiff procured the consent of the local
agent to the placing of that mortgage upon the premises, with
the histruction that if he did it "would be a waiver of the
company of this special clause in the policy." The jury necessarily found that- the plaintiff did procure such consent, and
hence that there was such waiver. It is urged that a local agent
for an insurance company is an agent for such company for all
purposes, under § 1977 R.S. Expressions may be found, when
not limited by the facts of the particular case being considered,
authorizing such an inference. But the authority of a decision
is necessarily limited to the points decided. True, that section
declares, that "whoever" does one of the several things therein
mentioned, "shall be held an agent of such corporation to all
intents and purposes ;" but such agency, after all, is limited to
the act of the particular person in doing one or more of the
things thus specifically designated. In that sense "the word
agent whenever used" in chapter 89 R. S. is to "be construed
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to include all such persons." (1d.) In other words, whenever
an insurance company authorizes any person to do any one of
the thing. thus specified, it cannot disclaim the agency of such
person in the doing of anything necessarily implied in the
specific act thus authorized. Thus it has been frequently held,
by this and other courts, in effect, that where a person was
authorized by an insurance company to make a contract of insurance, he thereby had implied authority in doing so to waive
stipulations as to the condition of the property, or other facts
then existing, and it may be as to subsequent conditions, if
such waiver is made at the time of effecting the insurance. But
those cases have no bearing upon the question here presented.
This contract of insurance was completed in all of its terms,
and binding upon both parties, June 10, 1885. The plaintiff
accepted it with all its conditions and limitations. In the
absence of any fraud or mistake, he was, on general principles,
conclusively presumed to know its contents: Herbst v. Lowe,
65 Wis. 321 ; Brown v. fass. ff. L. Ins. Co., 59 N. H. 298.
Thus it appears that the policy was " made and accepted" by
the plaintiff with knowledge in law of its contents, "upon the
above express conditions" to the effect that no local agent, at
least, "can in any manner waive either or any of the conditions
of this policy." With this policy in his possession, and more
than nine months after the contract of insurance had been completed, the plaintiff, according to his testimony, requested the
local agent to allow him permission, notwithstanding the conditions of the policy, to place the mortgage upon the premises,
and claims that such agent answered: "It is all right; go
ahead and make out the contract." In other words, it is
claimed that, notwithstanding the conditions and limitations in
the policy, it was, nevertheless, competent for the local agent,
and without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, or any
of its general officers, and without any consideration, and by
mere words, to essentially change and modify the contract which
had already been completed and binding upon the parties for
more than nine months. Certainly no such alteration of an
existing contract, without the knowledge or consent of one of
the parties to it, in any other business would be permitted. We
must hold, that when the assured has accepted a policy contain-
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ing a clause prohibiting the waiver of' any of its provisions by
the local agent, he is bound by such inhibition, and that any
subsequently attempted waiver merely by virtue of such agency
is a nullity. This proposition seems to be supported by the
weight, as well as the logic, of the adjudicated cases: .Merscrau
v. Phcenix Mat. L. Ins. Co., 66 N. Y. 274 ; .Afarvin v. Univ. L.
Ins. Co., 85 Id. 278 ; O'Reilly v. Corporation of L. Ass.,
101 Id. 575; KIyte v. Cont. U. A. Co., 144 Mass. 43; eILityre v. .hiclt. S. Is. Co., 52 Mich. 188; Cleavers v. Traders'
11s. Co., S. 0. Mich. April 21, 1887; Bowlin v. Icekla F. Ins.
Co., S. C. Mlinn. February 21, 1887; Shuggart v. Lycorning
Ins. Co., 55 Cal. 4u8 ; Enos v. Sun Ins. Co., 67 Id. 621 ; Leonard v. American Ins. Go., 97 Ind. 299 ; TVinnesheik Is. Co. v.
.lolzgrafe, 53 III. 516 ; Universal Ins. Co. v. Weiss, 106 Pa. St.
20; Pottsville L. F. ins. Co. v. Al3innequa Spring Inprovelnent
Co., 100 Id. 137. Some of these cases go much further in
favor of the insurance company than the proposition stated.
By citing them we are not to be regarded as committing ourselves to anything extraneous to the question here involved and
decided.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause
is remanded for a new trial.
Cases in which limiations on agqen'
powers have been sustained.-The purpose of this note is to state the substance of the decisions.upon provisions
more or less resembling that passed
upon in the case reported. Such conditions in policies are of recent origin.
One of the earliest cases in which a
similar provision was considered is
atoir v. American Life Ins. Co., 33
N.J. L. 487. The policy there pa sed
upon provided that it should expire
-it
noon on the last day of the period
for which payment had been made,
and that "agents are not authorized
to make contracts for the company,
nor to write upon the policy, except
the signature when necessary to the
first receipt of premium, nor to waive
forfeiture of the same." The court
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ruled that by accepting the policy
with such a condition, the insured
estopped himself from claiming that
the agent possessed other or different
powers than the company had delegated to him, and that lie could not
dispense with the condition concerning payment either before or after a
forfeiture accrued.
Under a policy providing that if
it was assigned the assignment must
be approved by an officer or agent of
the company, and if there was a sale
of the property insured without the
consent of the company indorsed it
should be void, and that "no agent is
empowered to waive any of the conditions of this policy, either before or
after loss. without special authority in
writing from the company," notice to
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a local agent of such transfer and assignment was held not binding upon
the company; nor was his promise to
have the proper indorsement made:
Shuggart v. Lycoming Ins. C., 55 Cal.
408.
In .Yerseraziv. Phonix Ins. Co., 66
N. Y. 274, the policy provided that if
the premiums were not paid as agreed
at the office of the bompany, or to its
agent on his producing a receipt duly
signed, it should cease and determine.
An indorsement was to the effect that
no receipt should be considered valid
unless it was signed as required, "and
that no agent has authority to receive
any premium without first presenting a regularly sign-.a receipt from
the president or secretary, or to
interline, alter, or otherwise change
any policy, or to receive any premium
after date of its beirng due, without
special permission from the officers of
the company" The company which
issued the policy was a foreign one,
and the agent who was alleged to have
waived the condition was empowered
to take applications, issue and deliver
policies, receive and receipt for premiums. A bare majority of the court
held that he was not a general agent
with authority to waive the condition
as to payment. Three judges were of
the opinion that that condition might
be waived by a general agent, and
three that it could not, nothing further appearing, and the seventh expressed no opinion.
In Aarvinv. Universal Life Ins. C.,
85 N . Y. 278, the policy expressed
that any alteration or waiver of its
conditions, unless made at the head
office and signed by an officer of the
company, shall not be considered
valid. It was ruled that a general
agent could not waive the payment of
the second premium, the insured
having the policy in his possession.
The policy sued upon in McIntyre

v. Michigan Ins. Co., 52 M3ich. 188,
provided that none of its conditions
should be waived or dispensed with
by any agent or servant witliout the
concurrence of the secretary of the
company in writing. The application recited that it was made with
knowledge on the part of the applicant that no agent was empowered to
waive its conditions. The court held
that a local agent could not waive a
condition concerning the payment of
a premium note.
The Michigan court in Cneaver v.
Traders' Ins. Co., S. C. Mich., April
21, 1887, held under a recital in the
policy that "it is further understood
and agreed, and made part of the
contract, that the agent of this company has no authority to waive,
modify, or strike from the policy any
of its printed conditions," nor, if it
become void, to revive it, that an
agent's verbal consent to other insurance on the property did not bind
his principal.
In Pottsville Ins. Co. v. .innequa Co.,
100 Pa. St. 137, and Greene v. Lycoming FireIns. Co., 91 Id. 387, it was held,
under provisions declaring that no
waiver should be binding unless it
was express and in writing, under the
signature of the secretary, and that no
agent could waive any provision of
the contract unless he was authorized
to do so in writing, that local agents
were powerless to dispense with the
conditions concerning payment of
premiums.
In ffraynesboro .3uiualCo.v. Cbnorer,
98 Pa. St. 384, the policy stipulated
that the company shall in no case be
deemed to have waived a full, literal,
and strict compliance with, and performance of, each and every of the
terms, provisions, conditions, and
stipulations to be performed and observed by and on the part of the
insured, unless the waiver be express
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and manifested in writing under the
signature of the president and secretary. It was held, that a general
agent could not, after loss, waive the
provision regulating the time within
which an action should be brought.
The policy sued upon in Insurance
Cos. v. Sorsby, 60 Miss. 302, recited
that it was made and accepted in reference to its terms and conditions,
and expressed that only the managers
of the company were authorized to
make, change, or grant any privileges
under it, "and any indorsement or
agreement varying the contract, made
by any agent or sub-agent of tile company, is void." An agent who was not
authorized to issue policies was held
powerl2ss to waive a condition prohibiting other insurance on the property covered by the policy.
It was provided in the policy that
"agents of this company will receive
premiums when due, but are not authorized in any case to make, alter,
or discharge contracts." .Held, that
an agent had no authority to receive
a premium after the day on which it
became due: FranklinLife Ins. Co. v.
Srfton, 53 Ind. 380.
The company's agent fraudulently
inserted misstatements in an application which was made a warranty.
The applicant signed it without reading it or being aware of its contents.
The agent was without authority to
enter into contracts. The policy subsequently issued declared that the
"president and secretary of the company are alone authorized to make,
alter, or discharge contracts, or to
waive forfeitures." This was in the
hands o~f insured several days before
the premium was paid. Held, that
the agent was not competent to waive
the misstatements in the application:
Ryan v. World .ilutualLife na. Co., 41
Conn. 168.
It was a condition of the policy that

it should not be in force until the advance premium was paid, and that it
should not be considered paid unless
a receipt, duly signed by the president
or secretary, was given therefor at the
time of payment; also, that no agent
shall make any contract binding the
company, nor alter or change any condition of the policy nor waive a forfeiture. The applicant covenantedin
his application that under no circumstances should the policy be in force
untilthe premium had been paid. The
policy was delivered without requiring payment by an employee of a
general agent, who was not known to
the company. It was held that the
latter was not bound. The court say
that credit for the premium could only
be given through the act or by the
sanction of the Board of Directors or
the executive officers of the company:
Davisv. Massaehusetts .MutualLife Ins.
Co., 13 Blatch. 462.
The application expressed that
statements not written in it would
not be recognized by the company;
and the policy, that no alteration of
its terms should be valid and no forfeitures waived unless the alteration
or waiver was in writing and signed
by the president or secretary; no
agent had authority to make, alter, or
discharge contracts, waive forfeitures,
extend credit, grant permits, and no
statement made or given to the person transmitting the application or to
any other person (unless written)
should bind the company or affect its
rights. Held, that the company was
not bound by representations of the
agent, regardless of his powers, concerning the amount of dividends
which would become due the applicant: Cleenger v. Mlutual Life Ins.
Co., 2 Dak. 114.
It was required that insured should
give written notice of loss to the company; payment was to be made
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within sixty days after the proofs
should have been made at the home
office. .HrTeld,that a local agent whose
authority was limited to fixing rates,
countersigning and delivering policies, subject to the approval of his
principal, could no' waive the requirement: Rowlin v. Hdela Fire Ins.
Co., S. Ct. Minn., February 21, 1887.
It was a condition of an open policy
that time property to be insured by it
should belong to, or be held by, the
assured, in trust or on commission, or
sold and not delivered. HAed, that it
was not competent for an agent to bind
his principal by a course of dealing so
as to make it liable for a loss of property in which assured had another
and different interest: FirstNat.-Bank
v. LancashireIns. Co, 62 Tex. 461.
If the acts of a principal have not
induced a policy-holder to believe that
the exercise by the agentof powers in
excess of those given him will be ratified, the principal is not bound by such
acts when they are beyond the agent's
authority and the assured has notice
of the limits of such powers: Insurance Co. v. olff, 95 U. S. 326.
The assent of the company in writing was required if there was any
change in the situation or circumstances affecting the risk. A local
agent who was authorized to receive
premiums and issue policies, gave
verbal consent to a change in the use
of the premises. It did not appear
that he had any larger powers or that
he had been held out by his principal
as possessing authority to waive conditions orthat his acts in waivingthem
had been ratified. The court held that
he was not empowered to waive provisions incorporated in the contract:
Ejyte v. Commercial Union Assurance
Co, 144 Mass. 43.
The membersof a mutual company
are bound by its by-laws, and are
chargeable with notice of them.

Hence, where it is provided by a bylaw that if other insurance should be
placed upon property insured by the
company, its policy should be void,
unless the consent of the directors
was indorsed thereon, an agent cannot
give such consent as binds the compary: Behler v. German Mutual F.
Ins. Co, 68 Ind. 357.
When the limitationis not binding.The agent of a foreign company, appointed by it pursuant to law, for the
purpose of enabling it to transact business, who is authorized to accept risks,
fix rates, and issue policies, and issupplied with the latter in blank for him
to issue and countersign, stands in the
place of the company in the State for
which lie was appointed, and is authorized to waive a condition in a
policy requiring written notice of loss
to be furnished the company: Eastern
B B. Co. v. Relief Ins. Qb., 105 Mass.
570.
The policy declared that the president or secretary were alone authorized to make, alter, or discharge contracts or waive forfeitures. The insured arranged with a friend for the
latter to pay the annual premium for
him when it should become due, but
did not inform him when it was payable.
The friend applied to the
agents to whom payments had previously been made for information as
to the time. They did not inform
him, though they had the renewal receipt in their possession, but promised
to give seaqonable notice of the day.
In consequence of their neglect, payment was not made within the prescribed time. The company was held
liable for the neglect of the agents:
Selvage v. ohn Hancock Mutual Life
14s. Co., U. S. C. Ct. E. Dist., N. Y.
June 17, 1882,12 Fed. Rep. 603.
Restrictions contained in the policy, upon the powers of an agent, are
inoperative until it has been uncon-
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ditionally accepted by the person to
whom it was delivered. They do not
affect the power of the agent to make
a conditional contract for insurance:
Hanickell v. New York Lyle LI. Co.,
40 Hun. 558.
A life policy stipulated that acceptance of the premium due thereon by
the company or its agents, after the
day upon which it became due, must
be considered as an act of grace or
courtesy, and not as a precedent for
future payment, or a waiver of the
forfeiture, if any future payment was
not made as agreed. "Agents of the
company are in no case authorized to
make, alter, or discharge contracts or
waive forfeitures." feld, that payment made to a general agent, after
the day fixed therefor, was good, insured being in good health. The
first clause of the condition stated
gave implied consent for the agent
to receive such payment, and by receiving it he did not exceed his
powers: American Life Ins. Co. v.
Green, 57 Ga. 469.
It was a condition of the policy that
agents are not authorized to waive
forfeitures, to make, alter, or discharge contracts; and that "no agent
has authority in any case to waive or
postpone payment of premiums, and
the assured is hereby notified that the
only evidence to him of the authority
of an agent to receive any premiums
nn account of this policy is a receipt
in printed form, signed by the president or secretary of the company."
Held, not to be binding upon the
general agent of a foreign company,
who had no superior officer or agent
in the State in which the territory
assigned him was so situated, so as to
render him incompetent to contract
that services rendered by an insured,
as medical examiner for the company, should he regarded as payment
of the premium: Wi/lcuts v. North-
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weetern Mutual Life Ins. Cb., 81 Ind.
300.
A provision that no agent could
waive any of the conditions of the
policy, without special authority in
writing from the company, applies to
local and not to general agents. In
the absence of proof to the contrary,
a general agent is presumed to possess
authority to transact all business relating to insurance and the business of
the company generally. An agent
who executes a policy as a general
agent and one whose authority was
co-extensive with the State in which
he acted, may bind his principal by
waiving a condition of a policy
without special authority in writing:
Carriganv. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co., 53
Vt. 418, 427.
A general agent may bind his
principal by extending the time for
the payment of the premium, notwithstanding the policy declares that
agents were not authorized to make,
alter, or discharge contracts: Marcus
v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., 68
N.Y. 625.
An open policy issued to a general
agent of the company provided that
if the assured shall have or shall
hereafter make any other insurance
on the property hereby insured or
any part thereof, without the consent
of the company written hereon, it
should be void. Such agent was named
in the policy as the person insured.
He issued certificates in favor of third
persons to whom he had previously
issued policies, insuring the same
property without making indorsements on the policy. Held, that he
thereby waived the condition requiring indorsement in writing: Richmond v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 79
N. Y. 230.
The policy acknowledged the receipt of the first premium and expressed that no receipts for premiums
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should be valid unless signed by the
president or secretary, and that no
agent had authority to alter a policy,
or to receive any premium after it
became due, without special permission from the officers of the company. This was held not to be a
limitation upon the power of a general
agent as to the first premium: Palmer
v. Phcenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 84
N. Y. 63.
The company may estop itself from
claiming the benefit of a limitation
on the powers of its agent which is
known to the insured, as by its custom in allowing him to extend the
time for paying premiu'ns and notes
given therefor: Insurance Co. v. Nor-

ton, 96 U. S. 234; Insurance Co. v.
Wolff, 95 Id. 326.
.Method of waiver.-An dgent possessed of the fullest authority can
waive the conditions of a policy only
in the manner in which it prescribes.
By accepting a policy with a condition concerning the manner in which
its provisions may be waived, the insured becomes bound thereby: Kyte v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co., 144
Mass. 43. A condition in a policy
issued by a mutual company, that
none of its terms should be waived,
unless clearly expressed and indorsed
upon it, is binding upon the president
thereof: UniversalMutual Fire Ins. Co.

v. Weim, 106 Pa. St. 20. Such a conditionis binding upon the local agents
of a stock company: Enos v. Sun Ins.
Co, 67 Cal., 621; Gladdingv. California
Ins. Co., 66 Id. 6 ; McCormick v. Springfield Ins. Co., Id. 361; Walsh v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 5, where

three judges dissented. Earlier cases
on this point are collected in May on
Ins., a 369, 370.
The weight of authority is in the
contrary direction where the policy
is not under seal. An agent's oral
waiver is good where it was required

that consent in writing by the company be indorsed: New Orleans Ins.
Co. v. O'Brian, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 785
(Ky. Superior Court); Plhington v.
NationalIns. Co., 55 Mo. 172; Hayward
v. zrational 1ns. Co., 52 Id. 181; Horwvitz v. Equitable Mutual Ins. Co., 40
Id. 557. If an agent has authority to
waive by indorsement on the policy,
he may bind his principal by an oral
waiver: Young v. HartfordFire Ins.
Co., 45 Iowa 377 ; V'ele v. Germania
Ins. Co., 26 Id. 9; Wright v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 522; Palmerv. St.
Paul F. & 31. Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 201;
Gans v. St. Paul F. & Xl. In. Co., 43
Id. 108; McCahe v. Dutchesm County
Mfutual Ins. Co.. 14 Hun. 599; Pechner
v. Phanix ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 195;
Goldwater v. Liv~enool, etc., Ins. Co., 39
Hun. 176.
A provision that the conditions of
a policy shall not be waived except
in writing over the signatures of the
officers of the company, applies only
to the formation and continuance of
the contract and such of its provisions
as are essential to its binding force
while it is r.nning; hence a parol
waiver of the condition concerning
proofs of loss is good: Corson v. Jersey City Ins. Co., 43 N.J. L. 301, 310;
O'Brien v. Ohio Ins. Co., 52 Mich.
131, 139.
The parol waiver of a general agent
is good, though the policy provides
that the use of general terms or anything less than a distinct, specific
agreement clearly expressed and indorsed on the policy, shall not be construed as a waiver of any condition
or restriction therein, such agent not
being specifically restricted: Steen v.
Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 31.5,
326.
The policy provided: Any policy,
renewal receipt cmtinuing a policy,
permit, consent to any agreement
whatever concerning insurance, not

